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ECONOMIC REFUGEES: UNPROTECTED
IN THE UNITED STATES
BY VIRTUE OF AN INACCURATE LABEL
Elizabeth Kay Harris'
INTRODUCTION
Since enacting the Immigration and Naturalization Act' (INA) in
1952, Congress has made several substantial revisions in immigration,
refugee and asylum laws.2 Spurred by changes in political situations and
economic conditions, Congress has attempted to make the United States
a safe haven for people fleeing from political persecution,3 workers
demonstrating skills in areas where their labor is in demand,4 or refu-
gees with relatives that reside legally in the United States.' For those
persons fleeing economic crises,' however, the "golden door"7 has been
* J.D. Candidate 1994, Washington College of Law, The American
University; M.A. Candidate 1995, School of International Service, The American
University.
1. 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101 - 1525 (1988 and Supp. I1 1991).
2. See infra notes 17, 22-25, and 27-30 (discussing the 1980 Refugee Act, the
1986 Immigration Reform Control Act, and 1990 Immigration Act, respectively).
3. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(A). This section defines the circumstances under
which one who is fleeing political persecution in a foreign country is termed a "refu-
gee" and entitled to remain in the United States. Id.
4. Immigration Act of 1990, Pub. L No. 101-649, Sec. 207-8, § 101(a)(15)
104 Stat. 4998, 5023-27 (to be codified as 8 U.S.C. § l101(a)(15)); 8 U.S.C.
§1101(a)(15)(H)(ii). This statute applies to temporary workers that come to the United
States with no intention of leaving their native country permanently. Id.
5. 8 U.S.C. §1101(a)(15). This statute defines categories of aliens that are
considered "nonimmigrant aliens" (as opposed to "immigrants") for the purpose of ap-
plying the Immigration and Naturalization Act. Id. Members of a "nonimmigrant
alien's" immediate family are also considered "nonimmigrant aliens". Id.
6. These persons will be referred to in this Comment as economic refugees,
rather than economic migrants, since in many cases economic refugees ultimately face
the same threat faced by political refugees: death or torture by governmental or guer-
rilla forces in the form of mass terror or starvation. The term "economic migrant"
more aptly describes workers who cross borders seasonally with the intention of work-
ing temporarily and returning home. The motivation for economic migrants entering
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only half-open. Moreover, the United States response to the recent out-
flow of Haitians from their homeland demonstrates8 that the door is
closing.9 Most economic refugees cannot prove that they are being sin-
gled out for persecution,"0 as successful political asylees must." They
therefore cannot obtain safe haven in the United States under current
the United States is primarily economic, even though political events, as opposed to
purely economic factors, may have caused an economic depression in their country.
Economic refugees are those whose motivations cannot be defined as political because
they are not being persecuted individually, as current legislation requires. 8 U.S.C. §
1101(a)42. "War refugees" or "civil strife" refugees may well be an appropriate label
for these economic refugees.
7. See Laura V. Kwiatkowski, Economic Refugees: Do They Have A Place In-
side the Golden Door?, 3 CAN.-AM. L.J. 189, 189 (1986) (quoting the 1903 inscrip-
tion on the Statue of Liberty: "[glive me your tired, your poor, your huddled masses
yearning to breathe free, the wretched refuse of your teeming shores send these, the
homeless, tempest-tost to me. I lift my lamp beside the golden door").
8. See infra note 85 and accompanying text (discussing the reactions of mem-
bers of Congress to United States policy toward Haitian refugees).
9. See SIMCOX, infra note 22, at 15 (showing that refugee admissions from
Latin America decreased steadily from 3,000 in 1975 to 0 in 1987, with worldwide
admissions of refugees declining from 146,158 to 12,397). Compare Statement of Alan
K. Simpson:
If we in government or politics are not able to bridle our compassion
for the less fortunate people of other lands sufficiently to protect the
"national interest," then not only will we have failed in our primary
official duty, including our duty to the least advantaged in our own
nation, but there is a substantial risk that in the long run the American
people will be unable or unwilling to respond at all, even when the need
is desperate. I refer to this potential unwillingness to respond as "com-
passion fatigue." The signs are all around us that it is already occurring.
Statement of Alan K. Simpson, U.S. Senator and Chairman of the Judiciary Subcom-
mittee on Immigration and Refugee Policy, reprinted in PETER H. KOEHN, REFUGEEs
FROM REvOLUTION: U.S. POLICY AND THIRD WORLD MIGRAMTON 141 (1990); with
Richard Rubottom, Morality and Resettlement 61, 63, in AMERICAN REFUGEE POLICY,
(Joseph M. Kitagawa ed., 1984) (asking how countries can have the will and resourc-
es to provide for foreign refugees when two-thirds of the world's countries are pri-
marily concerned with the survival of their own nationals, and answering that we
must "find the moral strength and commitment to defend great ethical principles").
10. See Immigrant and Naturalization Act, 8 U.S.C. § l101(a)(42)(A) (requiring
refugee applicants to show a well-founded fear of persecution because of race, reli-
gion, nationality, group membership, or political activity); see also Kwiatkowski, supra
note 7, at 300 (stating that the United States employs a policy of "selective admit-
tance," allowing entry only to those persons who "fit the definition").
11. Id.
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legislation. 2 This end result is unjust because economic refugees face
the same possibility of death by governmental mass terror campaigns
and starvation due to embargoes or other political tactics as political
refugees do. 3
This Comment focuses on recent events in Haiti, Guatemala, and El
Salvador, arguing that flight to the United States is a means of survival,
not merely an opportunity to enhance one's lifestyle."4 Part One exam-
ines current immigration and refugee legislation. Part Two discusses
events in Haiti, El Salvador and Guatemala and the United States re-
sponse to the situation in each country. Part Three argues that the Unit-
ed States has failed to address the problem of protecting economic refu-
gees, to acknowledge the reasons underlying economic refugee outflows,
or to conform to international standards regarding refugee protection.
Part Four offers recommendations for legislative reform, and recom-
mends including economic refugees in the definition of asylum eligibili-
ty, or alternatively, for a broader interpretation of "political".
I. UNITED STATES AND INTERNATIONAL REFUGEE LAW
This section looks first at the development of refugee, immigration,
and asylum law, and second at international law.
A. DEVELOPMENT OF POLICY
In the Immigration and Naturalization Act (INA) of 1952, Congress
established the definition of refugee upon which admission to the United
States from foreign countries is still largely based.s In the INA, Con-
gress used the same definition of refugees as that adopted by the 1951
United Nations Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees.'" This
definition requires applicants to show that they fled from a Communist
or Middle East country in order to qualify for admission as political asylees."
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. See Note, Political Legitimacy in the Law of Political Asylum, 99 HARV.
L. REV. 450, 462-4 (1985) (hereinafter Political Legitimacy) (examining the legitimacy
of economic issues underlying mass population outflows).
15. 8 U.S.C. § l101(a)(42)(A).
16. Opened for signature July 28. 1951, 189 U.N.T.S. 150 [hereinafter 1951
Convention].
17. 8 U.S.C. §1101(a)(42)(A). The current term "refugee" includes:
any person outside any country of such person's nationality, or in the
case of a person having no nationality, is outside any country in which
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The Refugee Act of 19808 broadened the asylum standard from
"clear probability" to "well-founded fear" of persecution 9 on five statu-
torily prescribed bases: race, religion, nationality, group membership, or
political activity,' and thus brought United States policy into line with
the 1967 United Nations Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees."
The 1980 Act also established a consultation process whereby the Presi-
dent and certain members of Congress determine whether humanitarian
concerns or national interests justify admitting certain refugees.'
such person last habitually resided, and who is unable or unwilling to
return to, and is unable or unwilling to avail himself or herself of the
protection of that country because of persecution or a well-founded fear
of persecution on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a
particular social group, or political opinion.
Id. The statute also allows for admission of certain persons by the President under
special circumstances. 8 U.S.C. §1101(a)(42)(B).
The INA also provided for ad hoc parole authority whereby the Attorney Gen-
eral could extend temporary safe haven to otherwise ineligible persons. Tahl Tyson,
The Refugee Act of 1980: Suggested Reforms in the Overseas Refugee Program to
Safeguard Humanitarian Concerns from Competing Interests, 65 WASH. L. REv. 921,
922 (1990). This authority was discretionary, and was intended to be used sparingly
for individual emergencies. Id. at 923. An estimated 1,000 persons enter the United
States annually with humanitarian paroles, which are restricted to a minimum amount
of time. Dennis Gallagher et al. and the Refugee Policy Group, Safe Haven: Policy
Responses to Refugee-Like Situations 11 (1987) reprinted in Temporary Safe Haven
for Salvadorans, Hearing Before the Subcommittee on Immigration and Refugee Affairs
of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary 100th Cong., 1st Sess. 212, 225 (1987)
[Hereinafter Refugee Policy Group Report]. Increasingly, as it was used to admit
groups of refugees, Congress perceived the need to create an official refugee program.
Id.
18. Pub. L. No. 96-212, 94 Stat. 102 (codified in scattered sections of 8
U.S.C.).
19. Refugee Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-212, 94 Stat. 102, 102 (codified as
8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(A)).
20. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42).
21. Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, Jan. 31, 1967, 19 U.S.T. 6260,
606 U.N.T.S. 268 [hereinafter the 1967 Protocol]. See also Kwiatkowski, supra note
7, at 193-6 (discussing the definition of refugee under the Protocol and the Conven-
tion, and United States obligations flowing from the definition).
22. 8 U.S.C. § 1157(a), (e). See also Tyson, supra note 17, at 922-25 (exam-
ining the Act in detail); Bamaby Zall, The U.S. Refugee Industry: Doing Well by
Doing Good, in DAVID E. SIMCOX, U.S. IMMIGRATION IN THE 1980s: REAPPRAISAL
AND REFORM 258, 259 (1988) (criticizing refugee organizations advocating determi-
nations of humanitarian concerns or national interests that have been spawned by
federally supported programs under the 1980 Act).
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The next change made by Congress involved the Immigration Reform
and Control Act (IRCA) of 1986,I which introduced several major re-
visions in immigration law, such as employer sanctions for anyone
knowingly employing illegal aliens, ' prohibitions on discrimination
based on national origin or citizenship,' and a provision granting legal
status to certain aliens. Congress next passed the Immigration Act of
1990Y This Act revised worldwide and per country immigration and
asylee levels, = increased border patrols, = emphasized admission of ap-
plicants possessing unique skills,' and reiterated the Bush
Administration's commitment to family reunification.' The 1990 Act
23. Pub. L. No. 99-603, 100 Stat. 3359 (codified in scattered sections of 8
U.S.C.). Vernon Briggs, a professor of economics at Cornell claimed that the
legislators' reasoning behind IRCA was that the actual number of illegal immigrants
is not as important as recognizing that the number is substantial and constantly grow-
ing. SIMcox, supra note 22, at 25.
24. The Immigration Control and Reform Act of 1986. Pub. L No. 99-603, §
101, 100 Stat. 3359, 3360-3374 (1986) (to be codified at 8 U.S.C. §1324a(a)(i))
(amended by Pub. L. No. 101-649, 104 Stat. 4978, 5053, (1990)). Such sanctions had
been considered as far back as 1952, when Congress finally gave in to Texan farmers
who relied on illegal labor, with the Texas Proviso, which stated " . . . the normal
incidents of employment shall not be deemed harboring." SMIcox, supra note 22, at
5. Sanctions were imposed for those knowingly harboring an illegal alien. 8 U.S.C.
§1324(a). Congressman Roman Mazzoli (D-KY) said the Proviso was virtually "hang-
ing a 'help wanted' sign at the Border." StMcox, supra note 22, at 5. Further, the
Select Committee on Immigration and Refugee Policy (SCRIP) recommended employer
sanctions, accompanied by some type of identification system, in 1981. Id. at 11.
25. The Immigration Control and Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L No. 99-603, §
102, 100 Stat. 3359, 3374-3380 (1986) (to be codified at 8 U.S.C. §1324(b)).
26. The Immigration Control and Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-603, §
201-04, 100 Stat. 3359, 3394-3411 (1986) (to be codified in scattered sections of 8
U.S.C.).
27. Pub. L. No. 101-649, 104 Stat. 4978 (1990)(to be codified in scattered sec-
tions of 8 U.S.C.).
28. Immigration Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-649, §§ 102-04, 104 Stat. 4978,
4981-86 (1990)(to be codified in scattered sections of 8 U.S.C.).
29. Immigration Act of 1990, Pub. L No. 101-649, §§ 541-42. § 280, 104
Stat. 4978, 5057 (1990) (to be codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1330).
30. Immigration Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-649, §§ 207-08, § 101(a)(15),
104 Stat. 4978, 5023-27 (1990)(to be codified at 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(15)).
31. Immigration Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-649, § 111, § 203. 104 Stat.
4978, 4986-87, (to be codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1153 (1990)).
See Dan Stein, More Immigrants, Good or Bad?, GANNET NEws SERvICE, Dec.
24, 1990 (critizing the family-based policy and stating that the adverse effects of the
Act will be felt for years). But see Raul Yzaguirre, More Immigrants, Good or Bad?,
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also established Temporary Protected Status32 as discussed in Section III
(A) below. Furthermore, although the Act increased legal immigration
levels by forty percent,33 it did not address refugee allocations.
B. INTERNATIONAL REFUGEE LAW
A substantial number of international treaties attempt to protect human
rights around the world.' The Universal Declaration of Human Rights
states that all people have the right to seek and enjoy asylum in other
GANNET NEws SERVICE, Dec. 24, 1990 (commending the Bush Administration for
enacting "generous, human immigration reform"). A reason behind permitting increased
numbers of family members to enter the United States was that such persons bring
skills, "benefitting local economies and creating jobs for others through their presence
in the workforce." Id.
32. Immigration Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-649, §§ 302-03, 104 Stat. 4978,
5030-38 (1990) (to be codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1254a). This provision gives aliens
temporary protected status in the United States so that the alien cannot be deported.
Id. The provision also gives aliens work permits for the period of protected status. Id.
33. Immigration Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-649, §§ 101-02, 104 Stat. 4978,
4980-85 (1990) (to be codified at 8 U.S.C. §§ 1151-52). See also Stein, supra note
31, (reporting that the 1990 Act allows for increased levels of immigration from
countries previously sending small numbers of immigrants).
34. See Universal Declaration of Human Rights, adopted Dec. 10, 1948, G.A.
Res. 217A(Ill) U.N. Doc. A/810 (1948) (listing the fundamental rights to be accorded
to all people); International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 16, 1966,
G.A. Res. 2200(XXI) 21 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 16) at 52, U.N. Doc. A/6316
(1966) entered into force March 23, 1976 in accordance with Article 49 (the United
States has signed but not ratified this Covenant) (outlining rights to freedom and life,
as well as rights in courts of law); International Covenant on Economic, Social, and
Cultural Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, G.A. Res. 2200(XXI) 21 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 16)
at 49, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966) entered into force Jan. 3, 1976 in accordance with
Article 27 (the United States has signed but not ratified this Covenant)(listing limi-
tations on states' authority, as well as the rights of all people to fair and equal wag-
es, education, and a minimum standard of living); Optional Protocol to the Interna-
tional Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, G.A. Res. 2200(XXI)
21 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 16) at 59, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966) entered into force
March 23, 1976 (the United States has not signed this Protocol) (furthering the pur-
poses of the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, particularly with regard to per-
sons claiming to be victims of violations of these rights); International Covenant on
Human Rights, signed Nov. 22, 1969, OAS Doc. OEA/Ser. L/V/II.65, doc. 6 (1985)
entered into force July 18, 1978 (the United States has signed but is not a party to
this Covenant); see also The Universal Declaration of Human Rights 1948-1988.
Human Rights, The United Nations and Amnesty International, Amnesty International
USA (1988) (giving backround information on international treaties designed to protect
human rights).
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countries." Countries grant long-term and permanent asylum to refugees
as benefits rather than as obligations.' As a result, there is no guaran-
tee of finding asylum in another country. While the United Nations
High Commissioner of Refugees (UNHCR) is responsible for supervising
international agreements that protect refugees," the granting of asylum
is not regulated by international law. 8
The Preamble to the 1967 Protocol states that the effectiveness of the
measures taken to protect refugees depends on the cooperation between
countries and the UNHCR.3 For example, Article 33 of the Protocol
forbids the involuntary return, or refoulement, of persons who meet
eligibility criteria for refugees.' Furthermore, Article 31 provides that
refugees cannot be penalized for illegally entering a country if they have
fled from a place "where their life or freedom was threatened.'T  The
United States, having ratified the 1967 Protocol, is bound by those
terms,4 but sidesteps both provisions by limiting its interpretation of
refugee.
4 3
II. MAJOR POLITICAL EVENTS IN HAITI, GUATEMALA, AND
EL SALVADOR RESULTING IN MASS CIVIL TERROR
Patterns of emigration from Latin American countries over the past
few decades show that many people are left with little choice but to
leave their countries due to deteriorating domestic conditions and politi-
cal unrest." Many people, for example, have fled Haiti, Guatemala, and
35. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, adopted Dec. 10. 1948, GA Res.
217A(Il), U.N. Doc. A/810 (1948), Art. 14, para. 1.
36. DAvID P. FORSYTHE, THE PoLmcs OF INTERNATIONAL LAW,: U.S. FOREIGN
POLICY RECONSIDERED 91 (1990).
37. Preamble to the 1967 Protocol, supra note 21.
38. FORSYTHE, supra note 36, at 91. The United States tends to support the
UNHCR's recommendations of grants of asylum as applied in other countries. Id.
However, when the United States is the country of first asylum, it is more apt to
ignore UNHCR policies. Id,




43. Refugee Policy Group Report, supra note 17,
at 262.
44. KOEHN, supra note 9, at 5. In effect, these people are pushed out of their
countries by mass terror of civilians. Id. They do not choose to come to the United
States merely because of the economic attractiveness of this country. Id These "push"
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El Salvador, countries that all share a common history of unequal in-
come distribution, militaristic governments, and years of mass terror
directed at civilians.45 Such conditions in Haiti precipitated an outpour-
ing of Haitians during the Duvaliers' regimes,' and again after the
overthrow of Aristide in September, 1991.' Civil strife in El Salvador
dating back to the 1979 coup has led to a mass exodus of Salvadorans
to the United States in search of safety. 8 Similarly, decades of social
and political instability in Guatemala have resulted in a continuous
stream of refugees to the United States, few of whom qualify for admis-
sion under the current legislation.49 Such a deluge of emigration dem-
and "pull" factors, which cause people to leave one country and be attracted to an-
other, however, are attributed indiscriminately to both refugees and legal economic mi-
grants alike. Id. Indeed, both categories of refugees are "pushed" abroad by forces at
home and "pulled" to the United States by its economic attractiveness. Id. The "push"
factors, however, differ greatly. Il Koehn divides the current South to North popu-
lation stream into four elements: 1) economic migrants, 2) official refugees, 3) dis-
placed persons, and 4) persons with family members in one of the first three catego-
ries. Id. at 4.
See LEO R. CHAVEZ, SHADOWED LIVES, UNDOCUMENTED IMMIGRANTS IN
AMERICAN SOCIETY, 25 (1992) (stating that economic migrants suffer hardship inflict-
ed by weak economies in their home countries and are thus lured to the United
States). Usually such persons are from Mexico or other close Central American coun-
tries. Id. They perform temporary, seasonal work, and return home between harvests.
Id.; see also Michael J. Heilman, Asylee and Refugee in AMERICAN REFUGEE POLICY,
supra note 9, at 88, 95 (arguing that the terms "refugee" and "economic migrant" are
applied to all persons of a given country based on United States perception of that
country).
45. See EL SALVADOR: A COUNTRY STUDY 101 (Richard Haggerty ed., 2d ed.,
1990) [hereinafter EL SALVADOR] (discussing unequal land distribution and the cost of
civil conflict to El Salvador); ROD PRINCE, HAITI: FAMILY BUSINESS 22-24 (1985)
(examining the increase in equalities under a series of leaders in Haiti after the with-
drawal of United States troops in 1934); SuzANNA JONAS, THE BATTLE FOR GUATE-
MALA 177-180 (1991) (discussing inequalities in wealth and land distribution in Guate-
mala).
46. BRIAN WEINSTEIN & AARON SEGAL, HAITI: THE FAILURE OF POLITICS 123
(1992). Approximately 80,000 Haitians left their homeland between 1972 and 1982.
Id.
47. See infra note 78 and accompanying text (discussing the number of Haitian
refugees and the United States response to them).
48. See infra note 95 and accompanying text (describing the number of
Salvadorans who have fled their homeland).
49. Immigration and Naturalization Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1l10la(42)(A); Refugee Act
of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-212, 94 Stat. 102 (codified in scattered sections of 8 U.S.C.)
and Immigration Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-649, 104 Stat. 4978 (to be codified in
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onstrates that a United States policy providing a safe haven is necessary.
The Governments of Haiti, Guatemala, and El Salvador have engaged
in campaigns of mass terror, killing civilians in order to repress suspect-
ed opposition or demonstrate force. Since political instability leads di-
rectly to economic instability, these governments have accelerated the
deterioration of living conditions in their respective countries." The
United States government, however, has been slow to extend offers of
safety to these victims," labelling them "economic" refugees and claim-
ing that in seeking to enter this country their foremost concern is to
improve their lifestyle.' In fact, these refugees fear just as much for
their lives as do the "political" refugees whom the United States pro-
tects.53
scattered sections of 8 U.S.C).
50. See EL SALVADOR, supra note 45. at 101 (stating that the civil conflict in
El Salvador has decreased agricultural production, damaged infrastructure, and diverted
funds from economic to military purposes, costing a total of approximately $1.5 bil-
lion).
51. See "Nonimmigrants Admitted by Country of Citizenship and Selected
Class of Admission," INS Statistics Div., August, 1992 (showing that between Fiscal
years 1989 and 1991, only 380 Salvadorans, 51 Guatemalans, and 20 Haitians were
admitted to the United States as refugees).
52. See FORSYTHE, supra note 36, at 99 (citing a State Department memoran-
dum from April 1984, stating that Salvadorans are traditionally migratory and emi-
gration from their homeland is not a direct result of the civil war). But see LET MY
PEOPLE LivE, FArrH AND STRUGGLE IN CENTRAL AM.RIcA 79 (Gordon Spykman et
al. eds., 1988) (stating that emigration is not desirable for most people because it
often requires separation from family and roots, and results in living illegally and un-
wanted in a foreign country).
53. See Kwaitkowski, supra note 7, at 191, n.18 (recounting the fears of a
Salvadoran woman: "if people were caught in the village, [the army] would kill them,
women and children alike ... with pregnant women, they would cut open the stom-
achs and take the babies out") (quoting STUDDS, EL SALVADOR: CENTRAL AMMUR CA
IN THE COLD WAR 149-151 (1981)); Dierdre Kelly, Guatemala's Refigees: Victims
and Shapers of Government Policies, 7 FLETCHER FORUM 323, 331 (1983) (quoting a
survivor of an attack on a rural Indian village in Guatemala: "It]he war started first
with the women in the house. With shooting, pure lead, they killed the poor women.
Afterward they burned the house . . . .We heard the noise of crying women and
children and they said our turn was next"). A survivor of a different attack said,
"[t]hey took my husband and they killed my brother on the spot and told us, 'We
are going to finish off the Indians.' So we fled. It is not possible to live in Guate-
mala." Il
1993]
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A. HAITI
1. Political and Economic Conditions
Haiti has a long history of violence and economic disparity.' When
Francois Duvalier took power in 1957,5" Haiti was in chaos, allowing
him to create a totalitarian regime. 6 Under the Duvalier regime, which
ruled until 1986, civil strife and violence ensued.
Througout Haitian history the economy has been largely polarized
between the wealthy political elite and the poor agricultural workers."
Under the Duvalier regime, this inequity in income distribution became
further polarized."' In addition, the secret police, or Tontons
Macoutes' tortured, executed, or kidnapped many people, especially
those who were politically active, and terrorized others.6t Jean-Claude
54. JAMES L. BUSEY, LATIN AMERICAN POLITICAL GUIDE, 60-62 (19th ed.
1991).
55. Id. at 61.
56. MICHEL-ROLPH TROUILLOT, HAITI: STATE AGAINST NATION 140 (1990).
57. Id. at 152-69. On July 3, 1957, the Military Council ended civil justice
with a decree, stating that all crimes would be under the Military Jurisdiction as
necessary, and giving the Military Authority the right to search homes at any time.
Id. at 151. The decree stated: "[e]ven crimes . . . against persons and property do
not escape Military Jurisdiction if the Authority deems it necessary. The Military
Authority is endowed with the right to search the homes of citizens DAY AND
NIGHT . In a word, it may take any measure necessary to restore law and or-
der .... . Id. Furthermore, the decree forcibly retired judges from the Court of
Appeals and the Supreme Court. Id.
58. 58. See id. at 151-56. See also JAMES FERGUSON, PAPA Doc, BABY DOC:
HAm AND THE DUVALIERS, 28 (1987) (stating that the United States occupation of
Haiti failed to improve living conditions, exacerbated the inequalities, and subsequent-
ly, Haiti's economy was inextricably tied to the United States); Pamela Constable,
Embargo Exacts Toll on Haiti's Squalid Streets, BOSTON GLOBE, Feb. 13, 1992, at 1
(reporting that the embargo enacted after the overthrow of Aristide in September,
1991, has made wealth disparity even more clear, with the elite barely affected by it
while most of the population are unable to afford necessities).
59. FERGUSON, supra note 58, at 58. The Duvalier regime adopted a repressive
policy against the people that held "whoever is not for the state is against it."
TROUILLOT, supra note 56, at 151. There were "authorities" and "others," the latter
realizing their position only after they had been separated out as anti-Duvalierist, or
Kamoken. Id. at 179.
60. See FERGUSON, supra note 58, at 40-41 (recounting the establishment and
the role of the Tontons Macoutes).
61. BUSEY, supra note 54, at 61. See FERGUSON, supra note 58, at 57 (stating
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Duvalier, succeeding his father in 1971, had a slightly less oppressive
regime;' however, the brutality, although less extreme, still contin-
ued.' Under Jean-Claude, the peasants suffered greater economic hard-
ships than any other class.'
In 1990, Jean Bertrand Aristide was elected President.' His over-
throw in September 1991, however, resulted in a mass exodus of Hai-
tians who could bear no more violence and poverty. '
2. The United States Response to Haiti
Duvalier gained the financial support of the United States67 by per-
that Francois Duvalier's reign was "the social and economic ruin of Haiti." with
30,000 to 60,000 people killed and many more exiled or terrorized).
62. Kwiatkowski, supra note 7, at 192.
63. See FERGUSON, supra note 58, at 71 (outlining Jean-Claude Duvaliers poli-
cies, including one that made insulting him or his mother an offense, and the "un-
leashing" of the Tontons Macoutes on the people).
64. TROUILLOT, supra note 56, at 181. Government spending during Jean-
Claude Duvalier's regime reflects the low priority of the peasants' needs. Id. at 181-
83. Toward the end of Jean-Claude's reign, the government spent only $3.44 per
citizen per year on health and $3.70 on education. I& at 181. Eighty-seven percent of
the children were malnourished, and although there was one doctor for each 8,200
persons, in some areas there were 60,000 persons without a resident doctor. Id. at
181-82.
65. BUSEY, supra note 54, at 64-65. The overthrow of Jean-Claude Duvalier in
February 1986, brought more violence and corruption. Id at 62-63. Violence occurring
during the presidential election on November 29, 1987, involving machete-hacking on
the streets, caused the election to be cancelled. d Raised in poverty himself, Aristide
has a vast following of peasants and urban poor. Lee Hockstader & Douglas Farah,
United States Presses Haiti's Civilian Leaders to Find Accord, WASH. POST, July 5,
1992, at A21. During the eight months that he held office he lifted the repression,
and very few people left Haiti, showing that even though the poverty was still ex-
treme, the people wanted to remain in their homeland. Kathleen Klarreich, Haiti's De-
mocracy in Limbo, CHRISTAN SCL MONrroR. June 30, 1993, at 20.
66. See infra note 78 and accompanying text (stating that 38,000 Haitians have
been interdicted by the United States Coast Guard while attempting to escape condi-
tions in Haiti). Violence has continued in the two years following the overthrow, with
the police and military attacking people believed to be pro-Aristide. Klarreich, supra
note 65, at 20. The Haitian military attacked and arrested people at a Catholic mass
and throughout the countryside on June 27, 1993, the day negotiations began in New
York for Aristide's return to Haiti. Id. See also Police Disperse Students in Haiti,
WASH. POST, July 16, 1992, at A18 (reporting that the police, supported by the mili-
tary, fired into a crowd of students and beat passersby during a street demonstration
in an attempt to suppress pro-Aristide protests).
67. TROUILLOT, supra note 56, at 203. The United States initially did not sup-
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suading the United States Government that totalitarianism was Haiti's
only protection against communism.' Despite blatant displays of vio-
lence by the Duvalier regime, its relations with the United States Gov-
ernment strengthened, with the United States giving substantial aid to
the Haitian military.'
The favorable attitude of the United States toward the Haitian govern-
ment, however, did not extend to Haitian people attempting to enter the
United States." Those attempting to enter the United States in the
1970s7"' and 1980s" fared no better than those fleeing the post-Septem-
ber 1991 coup. The Carter and Reagan Administrations, like the Bush
and Clinton Administrations, viewed the Haitian refugees as economic
migrants.73 In 1981, the Reagan Administration began an interdiction
port Haiti's independence. From the 1800's, the United States attempted to isolate
Haiti economically by officially refusing to trade with the country. Id. Some mer-
chants, however, did trade with Haiti, earning substantial profits. Id. at 53. These
merchants supplied nearly 45 percent of Haiti's imports, while buying only 25 percent
of its exports. Id. This imbalance accounted for nearly 79 percent of Haiti's trade
deficit, and the imbalance only increased thereafter. Id. In 1862, the United States
recognized Haiti because of its need to import cotton. Id. Three years later, Haiti's
trade deficit with the United States was six times higher than it had been in 1861.
Id at 54. Further, the United States could control Haiti's import market because the
low production costs and the proximity of the two countries resulted in prices lower
than those France or Great Britain could offer. Id. The 1915 to 1934 occupation by
the United States worsened the economic inequality by increasing the peasants' forced
contribution to the state as well as their dependency on a single agricultural product.
Id. at 16. Simultaneously, the United States centralized the government and "dis-
arm[ed] the provinces, both militarily and economically." Id.
68. See id. at 203. See also FERGUSON, supra note 58, at 42-43 (claiming that
the success of Haitian governments depends on their relations with the United States,
and that the United States looked favorably upon the Duvalier regime).
69. TROUILLOT, supra note 56, at 203.
70. See infra note 86 and accompanying text (giving examples of the reluc-
tance of United States citizens to admit Haitians into this country).
71. See FERGUSON, supra note 58, at 63 (discussing the famine of the 1970s
and the flow of Haitians to the United States after 1972).
72. FORSYTHE, supra note 36, at 97. Of the 1,661 asylum cases Haitians filed
between June 1983 and September 1986, only thirty were granted, an approval rate of
1.8%. Id. By contrast, the approval rates for countries with "unfriendly" governments
were higher: 60.4% of Iranian asylum cases were granted, 51.0% of Romanian cases,
45.4% of Czechoslovakian cases, and 31.9% of Hungarian cases. Id. This trend also
indicates that despite the 1980 Refugee Act, the Reagan Administration continued to
discriminate on the basis of national origin. Such discrimination violated Article 3 of
the 1951 Convention. Id. at 98.
73. Id. at 95. At the same time, however, the Bush Administration admitted
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program74 whereby the United States Coast Guard, with the permission
of the Duvalier regime,7s boarded boats leaving Haiti and returned any-
one determined to be an economic migrant2' This practice virtually
stopped the flow of refugees."
The outflow of Haitian refugees resumed following September 1991
despite the failure of the United States to provide a safe haven for those
fleeing dangerous conditions.' The situation grew worse due to contin-
Cubans as political refugees, indicating the emphasis on anti-communism by giving
safe haven primarily to those fleeing communist governments. Id. See also WEINSTEN
& SEGAL, supra note 46, at 123 (pointing out that under the 1980 Refugee Act,
Cubans tended to qualify for asylum while Haitians did not). Elliott Abrams, then the
Assistant Secretary of State for Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs, stated that
these Haitians were merely economic migrants attempting to escape from the poverty
of their country, and not "victims of persecution" or "voting with their feet."
FORSYTHE, supra note 36, at 97. In the same document, Abrams stated that "when [a
communist] . . . government has destroyed the people's rights and freedoms, and
destroyed the economy, people vote with their feet." again pointing up the distinction
between "unfriendly" communist governments and "friendly" democratic governments.
Id. The Clinton Administration also supports former President Bush's Executive Order.
and continues to intercept and forcibly return Haitian boatpeople. Restricting
Immigation Won't Solve Poverty Crisis, TORONTO STAR, June 27, 1993, at D2.
74. Exec. Order No. 12,324, 17 WEEKLY CO.P. PRES. Docs. 1057 (Sept. 29,
1981), revoked and replaced by Exec. Order No. 12,807, 28 WEEKLY COMP. PRES.
Docs. 923 (June 1, 1992). Between 1981 and 1985, of the 3,000 Haitians intercepted
on the high seas, not one was given asylum or refugee status in the United States.
FORSYTrHE, supra note 36, at 100.
75. Id. at 96.
76. Id. See FERGUSON, supra note 58, at 64 (stating that this policy redefined
the traditional refugee policy and led to the distinction between "economic" and "po-
litical' refugees). But see WEINMEN & SEGAL, supra note 45, at 123 (claiming that
Haitian citizens are subjected to both extreme poverty and "generalized political op-
pression" which makes it difficult to distinguish between political and economic rea-
sons for leaving).
77. FORSYTHE, supra note 36, at 96. Further, because the Haitians attempting
to immigrate to the United States could not physically enter the United States, they
could not go to court for a review of INS findings, as provided by statute. 8 U.S.C.
§ 1158(a)(1988).
78. Exec. Order No. 12,807 - Interdiction of Illegal Aliens, 28 WEEKLY CO,1P.
PREs. Docs. 923 (May 24, 1992). The Coast Guard had intercepted over 34,000 Hai-
tians since the coup. White House Statement on Haitian Immigrants, 22 WEEKLY
COMP. PREs. Docs. 924 (June 1, 1992). President Bush stated that "the safety of
Haitians is best assured by remaining in their country." Id Eighteen persons had
drowned in the previous week. Id. See also Ron Howell, Uprising in Haiti Stymied
By Fear; But Aristide's Supporters Are Getting Restless, NEVSDAY, May 31, 1992, at
15 (quoting a Haitian who tried to hang himself after the Coast Guard attempted to
282 AM. U. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y [VOL. 9:1
uing civil conflict and debilitating economic conditions. 9 Moreover,
economic conditions become inseparable from political conditions.'
Due to mass terror and widespread disruption and unemployment, refu-
gees face daily danger of attack,8 as well as starvation.'
President Bush's Executive Order No. 12807,83 ordering the forcible
return of Haitians without a fair chance to apply for asylum," met re-
sistance in Congress.' The UNHCR has condemned the policy.86 Pres-
return him to Haiti, stating that he prefered to be put to death than return to Haiti).
As of February, 1993, over 38,000 Haitians had attempted to flee their country, most
of whom were returned by the United States Coast Guard. Pamela Constable, U.S.
Hints at Tougher Sanctions Against Haiti, [hereinafter Tougher Sanctions], BOSTON
GLOBE, Feb. 6, 1993, at 1.
79. See 138 CONG. REc. EI,736 (daily ed., June 9, 1992) (Speech of Hon. Vic
Fazio) (stating that "military thugs" are in power in Haiti, and the OAS embargo is
"choking the life out of the Haitian economy").
80. See Ron Howell, Battle Weary, U.S. Firms Leave Haiti, NEVSDAY, March
8, 1992, at 6 (reporting that United States companies are leaving Haiti due to the
country's political instability; the departure of one company caused 4,000 Haitians to
lose their jobs).
81. 138 CONG. REC. E1,729 (daily ed. June 9, 1992) (statement of Hon.
Lucien E. Blackwell). An estimated 2,000 Haitians were killed in the two weeks
alone following the coup, and random attacks continue. Id. In May 1992, the army
attacked students during peaceful demonstrations urging that democracy be restored.
Id. See also Saul Landau, U.S.'s Haiti/Cuba Policy Needs to be Squared, S.F.
CHRON., Feb. 11, 1993, at A25 (stating that the Bazin government has caused approx-
imately 3,100 deaths by torturing, assassinating and imprisoning political opponents).
82. See Pamela Constable, Embargo Exacts Toll on Haiti's Squalid Streets,
BOSTON GLOBE, Feb. 13, 1992, at I (stating that many Haitians can no longer afford
basic necessities).
83. Executive Order 12807 - Interdiction of Illegal Aliens, 28 WEEKLY COMP.
PRES. Docs. 923 (June 1, 1992).
84. See Jerry Seper, Haitian Immigrant Study Supports Bush's Policies, WASH.
TIMES, June 27, 1992, at A4 (discussing the interdiction process). Only thirty-five
percent of refugees interviewed on the boats have been found to have possible asylum
claims. Frank T. Csongos, U.S. Says Mistreatment of Haitian Returnees Unfounded,
UPI, Feb. 10, 1992 available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, UPI File.
85. See 138 CONG. REC. El,738 (daily ed. June 9, 1992) (statement of United
States Representative Edolphus Towns (NY)) (claiming that the policy is "simply
barbaric and inconsistent with what this Nation is supposed to stand for"). Representa-
tive Towns went on to state that there is civil strife in Haiti which is causing people
to flee. Id. He called for a policy of Extended Voluntary Departure (EVD) status for
Haitians, if not a fair opportunity to apply for asylum. Id. Senator Pell recently ar-
gued that the refugee crisis is primarily the result of Haiti's political turmoil and will
not be resolved until political order is reestablished." 138 CONG REc. S7,476 (daily
ed. June 3, 1992) (Statement of Senator Pell). He pointed out that although the Unit-
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ident Clinton, who denounced President Bush's policy before the elec-
tion, continues to implement the policy,' which has been declared con-
stitutional by the United States Supreme Court.' The American public
has also refused to welcome the Haitians, feeling that because of the re-
cession the United States does not have enough resources to assist refu-
gees.' Critics of the policy complained that the Bush Administration
turned the issue into one of immigration, rather than of restoring democ-
racy.' The Clinton Administration attempted to aid in restoring democ-
racy by supporting the July 1993 agreement to reinstall Aristide to pow-
ed States has always dravn poor Haitians hoping to improve their economic standing,
it is only since the coup that the number of refugees has increased so greatly. Id.
86. See 138 CONG. REc. S7,475 (daily ed. June 3, 1992) (Statement of Senator
Pell)(citing the action of the U.N. High Commissioner). But see Seper, supra note 84,
at A4 (reporting that the Federation for American Immigration Reform (FAIR) defend-
ed the policy as the sole means of preventing or deterring mass illegal migration);
Csongos, supra note 83, (recounting the Bush Administration's dismissal of allegations
that repatriated boat people were being abused or killed); and Canadian-Supported
Centre for Street Children in Haiti Destroyed by Fire, CANADA NEWs WIRE, June 18,
1992, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Current file (reporting the arson-burning of
a children's home and training center in Port au Prince, which left 100 children
homeless).
87. See David Broder, Letter of the Law in Clinton's Haiti Policy, CHI. TRIB.,
March 7, 1993, at 3 (stating that President Clinton said he had changed his position
because of the number of people who drowned in January 1993 while attempting to
come to the United States). However, the Administration has also expressed concern
about southern states being inundated by refugees. Id. See also Kenneth Freed. De-
spite Clinton's Reversal Many Are Still Intent on Escape, LA. TIMES, Jan. 21, 1993,
at A4 (claiming that on President Clinton's Inaguration Day, 200 to 250 boats were
ready to sail and that 20,000 Haitians planned to leave despite President Clinton's
request that they remain in Haiti).
88. See McNary v. Haitian Centers Council, 61 U.S.L.W. 4684, 4684 (U.S.
June 21, 1993) (holding that the policy of returning Haitians interdicted on the high
seas is constitutional).
89. See Frank Pacheo, Letter to the Editor, TIMF, June 29, 1992, at 19 (stating
that the United States is having difficulty taking care of Americans and immigrants,
and that the United States is not obligated to solve Haiti's problems). But see Barry
Cutler, Letter to the Editor, TIME, June 29, 1992, at 19 (disapproving of Bush's poli-
cy). Anthony Scaduto, Plea for Asylum; Jesse Jackson, 40 others Arrested in Protest
Over Haitian Detainees, NEWSDAY, March 16. 1993 at 3 (reporting that Jesse Jackson
and 40 other people staged a protest in New York City against President Clinton's
refusal to release 267 HIV-infected Haitian detainees being held at Guantanamo Bay,
Cuba).
90. See Cathy Booth, Send 'Em BackH, TME, June 8. 1992 at 43 (quoting a
Carter Administration official who oversaw the 1980 Mariel boat lift).
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er.9' Doing so has proven difficult, as the military leaders have refused
to cooperate with the agreement.' The end of October 1993 saw an
increase in violence and a worsening of conditions due to embargoes
against Haiti.93
As the above discussion illustrates, conditions of physical danger and
extreme poverty engendered by political instability and policy in Haiti
underscore the weakness and inappropriateness of distinguishing between
political and economic refugees.' Continued inaction illustrates that the
United States government has failed to address the needs of the Haitian
people.
B. EL SALVADOR
1. Political and Economic Conditions
El Salvador was engaged in civil conflict from 1979 to 1991,9s dur-
ing which time many thousands of refugees fled to the United States
91. Tougher Sanctions, supra note 78, at 1.
92. Douglas Farah, Elections Sought by Haiti Group, WASH. POST, Nov. 1,
1993, at Al. In response to the lack of cooperation by military leaders and threats to
kill Aristide if he returns, the United States and United Nations have considered es-
tablishing a full embargo against Haiti. Id. The United Nations imposed an oil and
arms embargo in July 1993 in order to pressure the military leaders into allowing
Aristide to return. Ben Barber, Maimi's Haitians Live in the Shadow of Tragic
Events, CHRISTIAN SC. MONrOR, June 29, 1993, at 3. This embargo followed one
imposed by the OAS immediately following the September 1991 coup, which crippled
the economy. Howell, supra note 80, at 6. See Constable, supra note 82 (discussing
the effects of the 1991 embargo, and stating that it has not had any substantial politi-
cal results).
93. Id. at 14.
94. See Political Legitimacy, supra note 14, at 462-64 (developing a theory of
structural economic persecution which implies that refugees from Haiti, El Salvador,
and Guatemala should be entitled to asylum).
95. See EL SALVADOR, supra note 45, at 33-45 (describing the origins and
early years of the conflicts). See also INTERVENTION ON TRIAL: NEW YORK WAR
CRIMES TRIBUNAL ON CENTRAL AMERICA AND THE CARRIBBEAN 4-6 (Paul Ramshaw
and Tom Steers, eds., 1987) (accusing the government of conducting a war against
much of its own civilian population). See generally THE COMMANDANTE SPEAKS,
(Courtney E. Prisk, ed., 1991) (recounting the life of a sometime guerrilla leader
during the years of strife between the government and rebel forces). Peace Accords
between the government and the FLMN were signed in December, 1991; however, in
October, 1992, the peace process was in deep crisis and the cease-fire in fragile
condition. Douglas Farah, Crisis Grips Salvadoran Peace Process, WASH. POST, Oct.
25, 1992, at A29.
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and Guatemala." In the early 1980s, under several different presi-
dents,97 government forces killed approximately 750 citizens per
month.98 The conflict escalated over the years as the Farabundo Marti
Front for National Liberation (FLMN) guerrillas struggled to overthrow
the government.' The FLMN succeeded in paralyzing transportation
routes by bombing bridges and blockading roads, and hindered produc-
tion by bombing factories and making farming dangerous." ° Large
numbers of civilians were killed in the cross-fire between guerrillas and
government forces.' In the first half of 1988 right-wing death squads
killed 39 civilians, and they killed another 55 civilians in the first half
of 1989." z The Duarte regime tacitly supported these "killing cam-
paigns" in the rural areas of the country by not acting out against
them.m
In the 1970s, El Salvador was a relatively poor country, and it has
continued to grow poorer." The civil conflict, lasting throughout the
96. See Central American Refugee Settlement OKd, CHiC. TRiB., Feb. 1, 1991
at 2 (estimating the number of Salvadorans and Guatemalans currently living in the
United States who will be affected by a stay of deportation to be as many as
500,000).
97. BusEy, supra note 54, at 21. Jose Napoleon Duarte, leader of El Salvador
for most of the era of civil conflict, was elected in 1972. and subsequently beaten by
the military and forced into exile in Venezuela. Id. He returned in 1979 to co-lead a
civilian-military junta, and was made provisional president in December, 1980. Id.
After losing the 1982 elections, he again became president in 1984. Id.
98. Lee Tucker & Daniel Weiser, Undocumented Salvadorans: Temporary Safe
Haven as an Alternative to Deportation, 3 HARv. Hut. RTs. . 215. 215 n.4 (1990).
A United Nations Truth Commission Report released in March 1993, blames the Unit-
ed States-backed military for the majority of human rights violations during the civil
war. Warren Strobel, Of Rights and Vrongs: Foreign Policy Vow by Clinton Under
Scrutiny, WASH. TMEs, March 16, 1993, at Al.
99. See e.g. J. MICHAEL WALLER, THE THIRD CURRENT OF REvOLutnON: IN-
SIDE THE 'NORTH AMRICAN FRONT' OF EL SALvADOR'S GUERRIULA WAR 189-97
(1991) (discussing the November 1989 guerrilla offensive and the process leading to
it).
100. See BUSEY, supra note 54, at 24 (summarizing the effects of violence in
El Salvador).
101. Margaret Hartka, The Role of International Law in Domestic Courts: lWill
the Legal Procrastination End?, 14 MD. J. INT'L L & TRADE 99, 99-100. nA (1990).
102. Id.
103. See Kwiatkowski, supra note 7, at 191 (alleging that the Salvadoran securi-
ty forces routinely engaged in such campaigns).
104. EL SALVADOR, supra note 45, at 101. In the 1970s, El Salvador's per
capita income was less than that of South Korea, Malaysia. and Costa Rica. but
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1980's, displaced many workers and disrupted employment expan-
sion."°c High levels of government spending during this period reflected
the militaristic leaders' priorities."
Salvadorans who live and work in the United States have become the
largest source of income for those remaining in El Salvador." This
fact probably underlies the widespread belief that the primary motive for
immigration from El Salvador is economic."° This immigration, how-
ever, is also the result of the political situation in El Salvador."° Fur-
thermore, Salvadorans have also fled to Honduras and Guatemala, where
economies are also weak, which demonstrates that their reasons for
greater than that of Thailand. Id. In 1987, the economic output was barely 80 percent
of its level nine years earlier. Id.
105. Id. Between 1978 and 1985, the unemployment rate increased to 33% from
3.1%. Id. at 109. This increase would have been higher had not approximately
500,000 Salvadorans fled to the United States. Id. Real wages dropped by approxi-
mately one-third between 1983 and 1987. Id. at 108. The value of agricultural output
decreased at a rate of approximately 2.3% per year. Id. at 118. However, with the
election of President Alfredo Cristiani in 1989, a free market system was adopted
which resulted in economic growth of 3.4% and nearly 3.5% in 1990 and 1991 re-
spectively. Tom Welch, Business Confidence Greater in El Salvador, 113 BUsINESS
AM., 14 (March 23, 1992).
106. EL SALVADOR, supra note 45, at 115. Between 1972 and 1986, the mil-
itary portion of the government budget increased from 6.6% to 28.7%. Id. at 115.
Including military operating expenditures, total military spending accounted for 47.3%
of all governmental outlays in 1986. Id. Between 1976 and 1986, spending on edu-
cation dropped from 21.4% to 14.6% and over 1,000 schools were closed. Id. at 116.
One estimate placed the total cost of lost agricultural production, destroyed infrastruc-
ture, and military spending due to the civil conflict through mid-1987 at nearly $1.5
billion. Id. at 101.
107. Tucker & Weiser, supra note 98, at 230, n.39. See Gabriel Escobar, A
River of Green Flows to Salvador, WASH. POST, Sept. 24, 1992, at Al (reporting that
$920 million was sent to El Salvador by Salvadorans in the United States in 1991).
One Salvadoran money transfer business in Washington, D.C. reported that over $3
million had been sent to Central and South America during the first six months of
1992, with most of this money going to El Salvador. Id. By comparison, the United
States provided $220 million in aid to El Salvador in FY 1992. Id.
108. See Kwiatkowski, supra note 7, at 191-92 (claiming that the State and Jus-
tice Departments view Salvadorans' motives for coming to the United States to be
due to hard economic circumstances).
109. See CHAVEZ, supra note 44, at 37 (quoting a Salvadoran man living il-
legally because the United States will not grant him asylum). The man stated that he
was unemployed in El Salvador and that because the guerillas wanted him to join
them, he had to leave the country with his family. Id.
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leaving are not simply economic."0
In addition to the civil strife causing many people to leave their
homes, the 1986 earthquake, centered in San Salvador, left another
200,000 people homeless."' The United States definition of a refugee
does not provide for victims of natural disaster; therefore, such persons
must fit into another category to qualify for admission."'
2. United States Response to El Salvador
The 1979 coup was supported by the United States to prevent El
Salvador from "becoming another Nicaragua.""'  Although United
States aid was officially aimed at promoting democracy and curtailing
violations of human rights, the aid had just the opposite effect. Financial
and technical aid provided by the United States federal government
significantly enhanced the resources of the armed forces."' The FLMN
responded with violence to counter this aid,"' engaging in sabotage,
intimidation, hit and run attacks, and other guerrilla tactics.
' 6
110. Weiser & Tucker, supra note 98, at 220.
111. EL SALVADOR, supra note 45, at 82. Rebuilding after the earthquake, how-
ever, caused a slight growth in the construction industry in 1987. Id. at 107.
112. See 8 U.S.C. § 1157(e)(1988) (defining admission of refugees justified by
humanitarian concern).
113. EL SALvADOR, supra note 45, at xxi. Due to fear that the situation in El
Salvador would become similar to that in Nicaragua, the Carter administration offered
a greater amount of economic aid to that country than to any other Western Hemi-
sphere nation. ldL at 41-42. Between 1980 and 1991, the United States gave El Salva-
dor $1.1 billion in military aid. Leahy, Dodd Protest Aid to El Salvador, GANNTr
NEWs SERVICE, Feb. 19, 1992, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Gannett News
Service File. See also Tucker and Weiser, supra note 98, at 218 (discussing United
States military and economic aid to El Salvador); Peter S. Michaels, Lavless Interven-
tion: United States Foreign Policy in El Salvador and Nicaragua, 7 B.C. THIRD
WORLD W. 223, 232 (1987) (stating that because of the Duarte regime's violations
of human rights, the United States should not provide military aid to El Salvador un-
der the Foreign Assistance Act). By contrast, the FMLN obtained most of its money
by kidnapping wealthy Salvadorans. WALLER, supra note 99, at 107. The FLIN also
receives financial support from churches and humanitarian organizations in the United
States. Id. at 215-16.
114. Cynthia J. Arnson, Will Justice in El Salvador Be Stillborn?, L.A. TMES,
July 23, 1992, at 7.
115. WALLER, supra note 99, at 10-11.
116. EL SALVADOR, supra note 45, at xxi. The guerrillas perceived three "fields
of struggle" in El Salvador: (1) the north and east "liberated areas" where they had
influence over the population and the government was not yet present, (2) central El
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Despite evidence of life-threatening conditions, the United States con-
tinues to deny applications for asylum to Salvadorans. Between 1983
and 1990, when the 1990 Immigration Act gave Extended Voluntary
Departure (EVD) status to Salvadorans, less than three percent of appli-
cations were approved."' In contrast to the number of approved appli-
cations, a recent estimate placed the figure of undocumented Salvadorans
in the United States between 500,000 and 850,000. '18 In FY 1988-89,
the United States deported 3,048 Salvadorans."9 This number was
small compared to the number of undocumented Salvadorans living in
the United States illegally. Such a discrepancy in the figures indicates
that even after being denied admission most Salvadorans will not volun-
tarily leave.
The 1990 Immigration Act provided temporary protected status (TPS)
to Salvadorans."1 This provision allowed Salvadorans to register for
admission as immigrants between January 1, 1991 and October 31,
1991.1' Yet despite the signing of peace accords in December, 1991,
twelve years of civil upheaval have left El Salvador unable to handle
the numbers of Salvadorans who must leave the United States and return
to El Salvador under TPS guidelines."
Salvador, or "disputed areas" where guerrillas lived among the rural villages and
government forces lived in the towns, and (3) the cities, where terrorist actions oc-
curred intermittently by rightist and leftist organizations. Id. at 90.
117. Central American Refugee Resettlement OK'd, CIii. TRle., February 1,
1991, at 2. A federal district judge, however, recently approved a settlement blocking
deportation of nearly 500,000 Salvadorans, allowing them to reopen cases for political
asylum. Id.
118. Tucker and Weiser, supra note 98, at 215 n.5. Undocumented Salvadorans
in the United States account for more than ten percent of El Salvador's total popula-
tion. Id.
119. Id. n.6.
120. See infra note 162 and accompanying text (explaining that TPS allows
Salvadorans who were living in the United States at the time TPS was granted to
remain there for a specified period).
121. Immigration Act of 1990, § 303(b)(1)(C), Pub. L. No. 101-649, 104 Stat.
4978, 5037, (to be codified at 8 U.S.C. §1254a note (1990)). The amendment
changed the registration date from June 30, 1991 to October 31, 1991 by Pub. L. No.
102-65, §1, 105 Stat. 322, 322 (to be codified at 8 U.S.C. 1254a note (1991)).
122. Gagan Nirula, Hickey Says Salvadorans Need Extension of Immigration Act,
WASH. POsT, Mar. 7, 1992, at GIl. Cardinal James Hickey advocated an 18-month
extension of TPS. Id. He claims the country is not yet prepared to provide for the
large numbers of Salvadorans who would be forced to return. Id. See also Patrick J.
McDonnell, Central Americans Pose an Immigration Dilemma, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 2,
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C. GUATEMALA
1. Political and Economic Conditions
As with Haiti and El Salvador, Guatemala's civil conflict developed
from extreme disparities in wealth" and intensified as militaristic gov-
ernments'2 engaged in killing to suppress opposition. Violence has be-
come so pervasive that the society has been called a "culture of
death."" Beginning in 1954 with the United States-supported over-
throw of Jacobo Arbenz Guzman,"z Guatemala has suffered from con-
tinuous violence and repression."n The violence is aimed primarily and
openly at the Indians,' who comprise most of Guatemala's lower
1993, at Al (quoting a letter sent to the Clinton Administration from Salvadoran
expatriates that a massive influx of Salvadorans would have a catastrophic social.
economic, and political effect on an already delicate situation).
123. Kelly, supra note 53, at 329. Land distribution in Guatemala. as in Haiti
and El Salvador, is unequal, and has increasingly been concentrated in fewer hands.
Il In 1979, total farmland was owned by only 2.2% of the landowners. Id. The ma-
jority of the rural population owns plots too small to provide subsistence. Id. Ironical-
ly, Guatemala has the largest GDP of all the Central American countries. Tom
Welch, Guatemala and the United States: Companions in Democracy and Trade,
BusiNEss AM., March 23, 1992, at 10.
124. See BUSEY, supra note 54, at 14-18 (describing the political background
and government process in Guatemala). Even under a civilian reformer, Julio Cesar
Mendez Montenegro, president from 1966 to 1970, the military still controlled the
power, as is evidenced by its counterinsurgency against guerrillas that left 3,000 to
10,000 civilians dead in an effort to end all real and perceived opposition. BEATRIZ
MANZ, REFUGEES OF A HIDDEN VAR 13 (1988).
125. See Jeff Silverstein, Carry on Helping These Kids and You Could End Up
Dead, INDEPENDENT, March 31, 1992, at 18 (quoting Guatemalan President Jorge
Serrano). Between 1954 and 1991, 200,000 unarmed citizens were killed or "disap-
peared" by governmental forces. JONAS, supra note 45, at 2.
126. GEORGES A. FAURIOL & EVA LOSER, GuATEritALA'S POLITICAL PUZZLE 32-
33 (1988).
127. BUSEY, supra note 54, at 17-18. Under General Eugenio Laugerud Garcia,
the government repressed citizens involved in popular organizations that pushed for a
more democratic system, killing 100 to 200 people per month by 1979. MANZ, supra
note 124, at 14 (1988). Victims included peasants, students, church activists and lead-
ers of cooperatives, labor, and rural organizations. Id.; see also FAURIOL & LOSER,
supra note 126, at 41-49 (discussing the series of insurgencies between 1960 and
1980 and the lawless society that developed); Kelly, supra note 53, at 331 (discussing
the government's attempt to eliminate Indian cultures).
128. See Kelly, supra note 53, at 331 (reprinting a speech made by Tom
Harkin, then-United States House Representative, in which he equated the Guatemalan
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class." 9 Throughout the 1980s, while intellectuals were individually
persecuted, Indians in the highlands and northern lowlands were perse-
cuted in groups."
In 1982, the government of Rios Montt began the fusiles y frijoles
(guns and beans) program.' The program offered food and medical
care to citizens in exchange for participation in the militia and public
works projects.' Under this program, the government required Indians
and peasants to kill anyone suspected to be the opposition. Failure to do
so meant that the Indians and peasants faced the threat of being killed
themsleves.'" In 1986, Vinicios Cerezo Arevale became the first civil-
ian president since Julio C. Mendez Montenegro."M Despite Cerezo's
election, there was an increase in political assassinations, torture, and
death throughout the country from 1989 to 1990.3 A United Nations
Human Rights Commission reported that "indiscriminate collective exe-
cutions" in 1990 had left 48 peasants, eleven leaders of the Association
of University Students, labor leaders, and others dead.'36 Another civil-
ian president, Jorge Antonio Serrano Elias held office from 1991-1993,
government's policy with genocide.
129. Id. at 326. See JONAS, supra note 45, at 104-06 (stating that the vast ma-
jority of the Indians comprise the 87 percent of the population living in poverty, and
examining ethnic discrimination in Guatemala).
130. MANZ, supra note 124, at 145. In 1981, the government launched an 18-
month campaign of mass terror against civilians and guerrillas. Id. at 17. The EGP
guerrillas had a quarter of a million rural peasants, mostly Indian, supporting them,
making it "necessary" to destroy entire villages to destroy this support. Id. The gov-
ernment wanted to remove present as well as possible future opposition. Id. There
were three choices for those persecuted: to leave for Mexico, turn themselves in to
the military to be placed in a model village, or to remain in Guatemala in areas not
yet controlled by the military. Id. at 145; see also GUATEMALAN INDIANS AND THE
STATE: 1540 TO 1988 252-56 (Carol A. Smith ed., 1990) (discussing the role of the
Indians in the *war); JONAS, supra note 45, at 146-159 (outlining the series of
counterinsurgency campaigns in the 1980s).
131. Kelly, supra note 53, at 336.
132. Id. See also FAURIOL & LOSER, supra note 126, at 58-59 (examining the
characteristics of the Rios Montt government).
133. MANZ, supra note 124, at 337. A refugee from Huehuetenango explained
why he had fled: 'The army comes to our villages and forces us to go with them to
burn and kill people ...But we are not criminals and we don't want to kill people,
so we came here." Id.
134. BUSEY, supra note 54, at 19.
135. Id. at 18.
136. Id.
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but violence continued," despite his pledge to put an end to the vio-
lence and take command of the army." After Serrano's attempt in
June 1993 to establish a dictatorship, Ramiro de Leon, a human rights
lawyer, assumed power'39 and promised to establish programs to eradi-
cate human rights abuses."
In addition to physical danger, Guatemalans face extreme economic
hardships that are the result of political instability and terrorist cam-
paigns- 4 Currently, less than a fourth of the population lives above
the poverty line. 2
2. United States Response to Guatemala
Guatemala has been called the worst violator of human rights in the
Western Hemisphere.'43 An estimated 20,000 civilians have been killed
in the past thirty years. "' Nevertheless, the United States has been si-
137. ld See also Guatemala, Where the War Still Looks Cold, ECONOMST Feb.
8, 1992, at 36 (discussing the continuation of violence under President Serrano);
Silverstein, supra note 124, at 18 (reporting on persecution of street children by Gua-
temalan police).
138. Katherine King, Guatemala President-Elect Faces Insurgenc)y Povert% Ar-
my, REUTERS, Jan. 7, 1991.
139. Special Correspondent, Guatemala, New Broom, Slow Start, ECoN., June 26,
1993, at 51.
140. Id
141. See JONAS, supra note 45, at 95 (stating that years of conflict have wors-
ened the social crisis, causing severe food shortages, decreasing wages, and cutting
back in public services because the government diverts funding to the military).
142. See MANZ, supra note 124, at 48 (stating that 24.4 percent of the Guate-
mala population lives above the poverty line); JONAS, supra note 45, at 2 (stating that
less than 15 percent lives above the poverty line). The unemployment rate is approxi-
mately 45 percent, and the minimum wage per day is lower than $2. John Otis,
Proprietary to the United Press International, March 3, 1991. Government restrictions
on travel in some areas of the country prevent peasants from going to the hillsides to
gather firewood. MANZ, supra note 124, at 34. In addition, land has been taken out
of production by the government, or transferred from coffee or sugar production to
cattle or corn production, which are less labor intensive. Id. at 49. Further, civil pa-
trol duty, imposed on all capable men, restricts their ability to work at steady jobs.
Id. at 78. As a result of these circumstances, the basic needs of 35.7 percent are not
met, and 39.9 percent have a "less than minimum diet." Id Eighty-two percent of
children under age 5 are malnourished. Id
143. MANZ, supra note 124, at 30.
144. JONAS, supra note 45, at 2. An estimate 100,000 Guatemalan refugees live
in Mexico alone, and another 20,000 are displaced within Guatemala. Guatamala:
Bishop Claims 100,000 Refugees are in Mexico, INTER PRESS SERvIcE, Aug. 9, 1993,
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lent on the issue, continuing to support the governments."' 5 In 1982,
the Reagan Administration resumed military sales to Guatemala" 6
which had been suspended under the Carter Administration. This support
increased the government's capacity to wage mass violence on civil-
ians"'47 and its continuation has therefore been questioned.'48 The Unit-
ed States is reluctant to admit Guatemalans as refugees,'49 based on the
belief that Guatemala is a "friendly" country."5° As with Haitians and
Salvadorans, Guatemalans cannot meet the standard of proof required by
the current definition of refugee.'
Personal accounts illustrate that Guatemalans live in constant fear
inflicted by the government and rebel forces.' Yet by refusing to ac-
knowledge that these conditions are the cause of population outflows,
available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Inter Press Service File.
145. Larry Birns & Suzanne Jonas, Tie Strings on US Aid to Guatemala, CHRIS-
TIAN SCi. MON., June 4, 1992 at 18. See also JONAS, supra note 45, at 30-34 (stat-
ing that United States intervention in support of the Guatemalan government was
justified by the need to destroy the threat of Communism).
146. Kelly, supra note 53, at 353. This policy ended a five-year embargo on
such sales, and followed President Reagan's statement in December 1982 that alleged
violations of human rights had given the country a "bum rap." Id.
147. Id
148. See S. 1243, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991) (confirming that in 1991 Con-
gress drafted a bill that prohibited all military aid to Guatemala for FY 1992 and
1993 absent proof that the government had ended human rights violations, persecuted
police who aided in the murder and disappearance of street children, and moved to-
ward a democratic system).
149. See MANZ, supra note 124, at 189 (claiming that a large number of Guate-
malans are in fact eligible for asylum but are wrongly denied admission because the
standard of proof has been set too high).
150. See infra note 167 (discussing foreign policy concerns and the tendency of
the United States to ignore human rights violations by governments it considers to be
friendly).
151. DEmmraous G. PAPADEMETRIOU & MARK J. MILLER, U.S. Immigration
Policy: International Context, Theoretical Parameters, and Research Priorities, in THE
UNAVOIDABLE ISSUE 1, 11 (Demetrious Papademitrou & Mark J. Miller eds., 1983)
[hereinafter UNAVOIDABLE ISSUE]. Between October 1992 and March 1993, of 69,932
pending Guatemalan cases and 15,527 new cases, only 44 cases were granted, giving
asylum to 67 individuals. INS Statistics Division, August, 1993. Similarly, of 45,227
pending Salvadoran cases and 5,405 new cases, 23 cases were granted, giving asylum
to 32 individuals. l Of 5,632 pending Haitian cases and 4,955 new cases, 143 cases
were granted, giving asylum to 174 individuals. Id.
152. See supra note 54 and accompanying text (quoting survivors of attacks on
Guatemalan villages).
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the United States denies these refugees safe haven by claiming they do
not qualify as "political" refugees, as the current legislation requires.
III. LEGAL ANALYSIS
As set forth in Section I, Congress traditionally focuses on political
asylum and immigration concerns, rather than recognizing the conditions
that cause most refugee outflows." As set forth in Section II, conflict
between government and insurgent forces makes living in Haiti, El
Salvador, and Guatemala physically dangerous for civilians.'" This sec-
tion argues that because the United States refuses to acknowledge that
people in these countries are being persecuted, albeit indirectly, these
refugees are wrongly denied safe haven in the United States.
A. EXTENDED VOLUNTARY DEPARTURE AND TEiPORARY
PROTECTED STATUS
For groups of individuals fleeing a given country who fail to meet the
usual refugee criteria, Extended Voluntary Departure (EVD) is the
closest the Government has come to providing a safe haven.' 6 As a
discretionary measure, it allows the Attorney General and the State
Department" to take into account foreign policy issues rather than
purely humanitarian concerns." In 1983, the Attorney General and the
153. See supra notes 15-33 and accompanying text (discussing the changes in
refugee, asylum, and immigration law in Title 8 of the United States Code).
154. See supra notes 53, 62, 126 and accompanying text (discussing numbers of
civilians killed in Haiti, El Salvador, and Guatemala, and the state of fear in which
citizens live).
155. 8 U.S.C. § l101(a)(42)(A). EVD provides protection from deportation to
nationals in the United States from a particular country who have been given EVD
status by the Attorney General. Id. The determination of whether to grant EVD to
people from a given country depends on the level of danger in that country. 127
Cong. Rec. 9507 (1981) (statement of Senator Kennedy).
156. See Pamela M. Martin, Note, Temporary Protected Status and the Legacy
of Santos-Gomez, 25 GEO. WASH. J. INT'L L & ECON. 227, 230 (1991) (defining
EVD and calling it a "blanket" form of relief).
157. See Refugee Policy Group Report, supra note 17, at 232 (reporting that
State Department officials first make a determination that the countries of origin are
"unstable", "unsettled" or exhibit a pattern of "denial" of rights); see also Martin,
supra note 156, at 230-31 (examining the origin of EVD and the process for granting
EVD indicating that while there is no statute granting EVD authority, it is derived
from 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b) and 1254(e)).
158. Refugee Policy Group Report, supra note 17, at 234. As a discretionary
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State Department refused to grant EVD to Salvadorans despite a letter
from eighty-nine members of Congress requesting them to do so.' 9 In
his refusal, the Attorney General claimed that a grant of EVD would
encourage many more Salvadorans to migrate to the United States."w
Temporary Protected Status (TPS),"6  provided to Salvadorans
through the 1990 Immigration Act, creates a safe haven for those al-
ready present in the United States." Although it improves United
States refugee legislation, it nevertheless falls short of providing an ade-
quate remedy for asylum seekers. The Attorney General grants TPS, like
grant, neither individuals nor groups have a right to EVD, and it has generally not be
granted to Central Americans living in "friendly" countries. Id. Since 1960, sixteen
countries have been granted EVD status: Afghanistan, Cambodia, Chile, Cuba, Czecho-
slovakia, Ethiopia, Hungary, Iran, Laos, Lebanon, Nicaragua, Poland, Rumania, Ugan-
da, Vietnam, and Silva Letterholders (mainly Mexicans). Temporary Safe Haven for
Salvadorans, Hearing before the Subcommittee on Immigration and Refugee Affairs of
the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. 56-58 (1987) [here-
inafter 1987 Hearings] (statement of Senator Kennedy). See Id. at 57-58 (providing, in
a table, the dates and conditions of grants). In 1981 a "sense of Congress" measure
unsuccessfully urged the Administration to review case-by-case EVD petitions by
Salvadorans. Immigration & Nationality Act, Pub. L. No. 97-113, § 731, 95 Stat.
1519, 1557 (1981) (to be codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1157 (Supp. 1992).
159. Martin, supra note 156, at 233-34.
160. Letter from William French Smith, Attorney General, to the U.S. House of
Representatives (July 19, 1983), reprinted in 1987 Hearings, supra note 158, at 45.
Mr. Smith explains that there are other alternatives that Would provide adequate relief
to the Salvadorans, that the United States has a "finite capacity" in terms of social
services and law enforcement, and that life threatening risks in El Salvador are de-
creasing. Id. Cf Hearings 1987, supra note 158, at 157 (statement of Roger Conner,
Executive Director of Federation for American Immigration Reform) (recommending
that Congress remove EVD from United States foreign policy and immigration politics
and instead concentrate on long-term solutions to the conflict in Central America).
President Duarte, in fact, supported the proposed grant of EVD to Salvadorans.
Letter from President Jose Napoleon Duarte, President of El Salvador, to President
Ronald Reagan (April 10, 1987), reprinted in 1987 Hearings, supra note 158, at 175-
177. See id. (listing the reasons for El Salvador's inability to accomodate the mass
return of Salvadorans from the United States required by the 1986 IRCA).
161. Immigration Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-649,
§ 302-303, § 244A, 244A(note), 104 stat. 4978, 5030-38 (1990) (to be codified at 8
U.S.C. §§ 1254a, 1254a(note)).
162. Id. Under the TPS provision, Salvadorans may apply for temporary legal
status as immigrants, and upon approval receive work permits. Id. at § 244 (A)(1)(B),
104 Stat. 5030. However, upon expiration of protected status, they may be deported.
Id. Supporters of the 1990 legislation claim that TPS essentially codifies EVD. Mar-
tin, supra note 156, at 248-49.
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EVD status, on a discretionary basis as long as allowing such persons to
remain does not conflict with United States interests, where ongoing
armed strife within a country threatens the safety of persons who would
otherwise be returned,'" where a natural disaster prevents a country
from being able to provide for returning citizens," or where there are
extraordinary circumstances in a country."6 Although the 1980 Refugee
Act broadens the asylum standard, it still does not include what the
executive and legislative branches label "economic" refugees.'" Thus,
the current legislation fails to offer adequate protection to economic
refugees.
B. UNITED STATES FOREIGN POLICY AND REFUGEE ISSUES
The refugee problem and United States foreign policy interests, al-
though linked, often conflict.6 As United States involvement in El
163. Immigration Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-649.
§ 302, §244A(b)(1)(A) 104 Stat. 4978, 5031 (1990). See also U.S. Refugee Programs
for 1992: Annual Consultations, Hearing before the Senate Committee on the Judicia-
ry, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. 66, 68 (1991) [hereinafter 1991 Hearings] (testimony of
Gene McNary, Commissioner, INS) (discussing the effects of TPS and the 1990 Act).
164. Immigration Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-649,
§ 302, §244A(b)(1)(B) 104 Stat. 4978, 5031 (1990).
165. Immigration Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-649,
§ 302, § 244A(b)(1)(C) 104 Stat. 4978, 5031 (1990).
166. See Kwiatkowsld, supra note 7, at 201-04 (arguing that these refugees are
victims of both intolerable economic situations and political oppression, thus suggest-
ing a new category of refugees be proposed that would cover such cases).
167. See Al Kamen, Cold War Consensus on Refugee Aid Ebbing Despite Re-
lentless Need, WASH. PosT, July 20, 1992, at A8 (focusing on the potential of in-
creasing conflict over refugee policy in the post Cold War era). The goals of foreign
policy and humanitarianism are linked when the Government offers refuge to Cubans
or others fleeing communist governments, but clash when prospective refugees attempt
to leave "friendly" governments. Id. However, even under the 1965 Act, the two
hemispheres are treated differently, with applicants from the western hemisphere grant-
ed visas on a first-come, first-serve basis and eastern hemisphere applicants subjected
to a category preference system and a limitation on the number of visas per country.
THE UNAVOLDABLE ISSUE, supra note 151, at 14. See also John R. Silber, Closing
Rearks, in AIMRICAN REFUGEE POLICY, supra note 9, at 52, 53 (contending that
any United States responsibility for the world-wide refugee problem stems from failure
to link foreign policy and refugee issues); see also Jeffrey L Romig, Salvadoran
Illegal Aliens: A Struggle to Obtain Refuge in the United States 47 U. Prrr. L Rsv.
295, 315 (1985) (stating that a person attempting to leave a Marxist-Leninist govern-
ment is much more likely to be admitted as a refugee than someone attempting to
leave an authoritarian, non-Marxist government).
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Salvador and Guatemala demonstrates, military aid is not likely to re-
solve civil conflict quickly but rather permits it to escalate, increasing
refugee outflows." Thus, not only are these refugees unable to find
safety in this country, but they must also endure more intense strife in
their homelands.'"
The 1980 Refugee Act further entwined the refugee and foreign poli-
cy issues by requiring an examination of the political effects refugee
resettlement has on national interests and foreign policy consider-
ations.7 By linking the two issues, the Act obscures the idea of "hu-
manitarian concern"." While the international nature of refugee issues
will inevitably involve foreign policy concerns, the focus must remain
on the welfare of the refugee.
C. UNITED STATES NONCOMPLIANCE WITH INTERNATIONAL
STANDARDS
The United States has been particularly lax in signing and ratifying
international treaties aimed at protecting human rights" and meeting
standards set by the UNHCR. The mass refoulement of Haitians rep-
168. See supra notes 113 and 144 and accompanying text (discussing United
States aid sent to El Salvador and Guatemala).
169. See supra notes 113 - 115 and accompanying text (examining escalation of
violence in El Salvador as a result of United States aid to the miltiary); see also
WALLER, supra note 99, at 11 (showing that United States economic and military aid
has increased the government's capacity to wage war); KOEHN, supra note 9, at 403
(suggesting that the United States create and support policies that deter "mass expul-
sions," block attainment of weapons from other countries, and promote economic
programs aiming at ameliorating the disparities in the distribution of wealth); Sidney
Weintraub, Treating the Causes: Illegal Immigration and United States Foreign Eco-
nomic Policy in THE UNAVOIDABLE ISSUE, supra note 151, at 192-202 (1983) (exam-
ining United States trade policies regarding the role they can play in affecting emigra-
tion incentives).
170. See Tahl Tyson, supra note 17, at 933 (calling foreign policy an inherent
part of the 1980 Refugee Act).
171. Cf id. at 934-35 (recommending procedural changes that would ensure nec-
essary safeguards of humanitarian issues through foreign policy).
172. See Elizabeth Hull, The Rights of Aliens: National and International Issues,
in THE UNAVOIDABLE ISSUE, supra note 151, at 237-38 (calling it "lamentable" that
the United States will not relinquish any sovereignty by signing binding human rights
agreements).
173. See Refugee Policy Group Report, supra note 17, at 249 (referring to
Senator Kennedy's criticism of the government's handling of Salvadoran asylum seek-
ers); MANz, supra note 124, at 176 (stating that the UNHCR suggested that the Unit-
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resents a blatant disregard for a UNHCR policy" which allowed for
prima facie group determinations and a broadened definition of refugee
in cases of mass migrations.7 The Bush Administration could have
dealt with the Haitian crisis by applying this policy at the outset of the
1991 crisis."'
ed States policy toward Salvadorans who reach United States borders may violate the
obligations imposed by the 1967 Protocol); see also INTERVEnoN ON TRIAL, supra
note 95, at 61 (stating that the Reagan Administration violated obligations under the
1967 Protocol by forcibly repatriating "refugees of civil disorder").
174. U.N. Doc. A/AC 96/601 para 57(2)1IA at 16 (1981). The UNHCR Execu-
tive Committee in October, 1981, after Reagan had begun a policy of intercepting and
returning Haitians, adopted inter alia two measures that called for at least temporary
protection of refugees and non-refoulement in cases of mass migration. Id First, the
committee held that in such situations, asylum seekers should be admitted to the state
in which they initially seek refuge, and if that state is unable to admit them on a
durable basis, it should always admit them at least on a temporary basis and provide
them with protection. Id. Secondly, the committee held that the fundamental priniciple
of non-refoulement must be scrupulously observed. d In 1978, Amnesty International
recommended that the United States should not continue to deport Haitians without
full asssurance that imprisonment or persecution would not result. Haitian Refugee
Ctr. v. Civiletti, 503 F. Supp. 442, 482 (S.D. Fla. 1980), overnled on other grounds
by Jean v. Nelson, 727 F. 2d 957 (11th Cir. 1992).
However, even when the Haitian Government gave such assurances, they were
not always carried out. d See also Haitian Refugee Ctr. v. Baker, 949 F.2d 1109.
1112 (11th Cir. 1991) (Hatchett, J., dissenting) reh'g denied, 954 F.2d 731 (11th Cir.
1992), cert. denied, U.S. , 112 S.Ct. 1245 (1992) (asserting that although the Unit-
ed States promised the international community that it would not refoul refugees at
the border, it nevertheless goes into international waters to prevent the refugees from
reaching the border, making "a sham of our international treaty obligations . . . ").
175. Refugee Policy Group Report, supra note 17, at 263. The prima facie con-
cept was applied to respond to events in Africa in the 1950s and 1960s. but since
then, it has been used in many other areas. Il Absent contradicting evidence, the
group determination considers all members of the group refugees. d at 264.
176. See White House Statement on Haitian Migrants, supra note 78, at 924
(adopting the interdiction policy on the premise that the number of Haitian migrants
created a "dangerous and unmanageable" situation). The refugee crises arose because
the asylum application processing facilities were filled to capacity, and the President
urged Haitians to remain in Haiti and apply at the Embassy in Port-au-Prince. Id.
Using UNHCR guidelines, the United States could have avoided this backlog by mak-
ing a prima facie determination that all of these "migrants" were, in fact. refugees.
The UNHCR Handbook on Procedure states that:
[w]hile refugee status must normally be determined on an individual
basis, situations have also arisen in which entire groups have been dis-
placed under circumstances indicating that members of the group could
be considered individually as refugees. In such situations, the need to
298 AM. U. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y [VOL. 9:1
D. REFUGEE ISSUES IN FEDERAL COURTS
As past decisions illustrate, courts have been reluctant to expand the
traditional interpretation and intent of refugee and immigration legisla-
tion."n Cases often deal with either INS regulations and procedures'
or the two tests that have been established to determine eligiblity for
political asylum: clear probability of persecution, and well-founded
fear of persecution."
provide assistance is often extremely urgent and it may not be possible
for purely practical reasons to carry out an individual determination of
refugee status for each member of the group. Recourse has therefore
been had to the so called "group determination" of refugee status, where-
by each member of the group is regarded prima facie . . . as a refugee.
U.N.H.C.R., HANDBOOK ON PROCEDURES AND CRITERIA FOR DETERMINING REFUGEE
STATUS UNDER THE 1951 CONVENTION AND THE 1967 PROTOCOL RELATING TO THE
STATUS OF REFUGEES, para. 4, U.N. Doc. HCR/ID/4/ Eng. Rev. 1 (1979) reprinted in
Refugee Policy Group Report, supra note 17, at 264.
177. See Political Legitimacy, supra note 14, at 468-71 (concluding that the
judicial branch rather than the political branch should make decisions regarding the
political conditions of foreign nations).
178. See Orantes-Hemandez v. Smith, 541 F. Supp. 351, 358-59 (C.D. Cal.
1982), later proceeding sub nom. Orantes-Hernandez v. Meese, 685 F. Supp. 1488
(C.D. Cal. 1988) (finding that INS officials had coerced a number of Salvadoran
applicants into signing voluntary departure agreements without properly notifying them
of their right to apply for political asylum); Haitian Refugee Center v. Civiletti, 503
F. Supp. 442, 532 (S.D. Fla. 1980) (overruled on other grounds by Jean v. Nelson,
727 F.2d 957 (lth Cir. 1984)) (discussing the parameters of legal INS action and'
granting declatory and injunctive relief to Haitians who claimed the INS had discrimi-
nated against them on the basis of their race); Orantes-Hernandez v. Meese, 685 F.
Supp. 1488, 1497 (C.D. Cal. 1988), aff'd sub nom. Orantes-Hernandez v. Thornburgh,
919 F.2d 549 (9th Cir. 1990) (stating that Salvadorans are susceptible to pressure by
INS officials, since they have already suffered persecution from guerrillas, and are
aware that the United States provides assistance to the Salvadoran government); Hai-
tian Refugee Ctr. v. Baker 953 F.2d 1498, 1502 (S.D. Fla. 1992) (examining the INS
procedure for interviewing Haitians upon being intercepted by the Coast Guard, and
listing the questions interviewers must ask); Haitian Refugee Center v. Baker, 949
F.2d 1109 (lth Cir. 1991), reh'g denied, 954 F.2d 731 (lth Cir. 1992), cert. de-
nied, 112 S. CL 1073 (1992) (holding that the 1967 Protocol did not give any rights
to Haitians who had not entered United States territory).
179. See INS v. Stevic, 467 U.S. 407, 420-30 (1984) (applying the clear proba-
bility test as it was in conformity with the intent of the 1980 Refugee Act and the
1967 Protocol requirements).
180. See INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 440 (1987) (holding that only
a well-founded fear of persecution is needed to meet asylum requirements thus broad-
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In 1981, the District Court for the Southern District of Florida in
Haitian Refugee Center v. Civiletti,"8' undertook an extensive look into
the conditions of life in Haiti, the reasons for 'refugee flight, and the
asylum process." The court recognized that the State Department's
classifying the Haitians as economic refugees was the result of a social
or cultural gap," and concluded that the State Department Study
Team's investigation of the conditions should be granted "little
weight."'"
ening the interpretation of both the 1967 Protocol and 8 C.F.R. § 208(a)). The Ninth
Circuit has overturned a number of BIA denials of asylum by applying a more liberal
standard of political opinion. Mark M. Hager, In the Wake of Cardoza-Fonseca: Doc-
trinal Puzzles in Asylum Lnv, I B.U. PuB. INT. LJ. 119, 134-140 (1991); See Dsir
v. Ilchert, 840 F.2d 723, 727-30 (9th Cir. 1988) (overturning the BIA's denial of
asylum where a Haitian had been seized and beaten by the Tontons Macoutes several
times after he refused to pay them bribes, and holding that in the Haitian culture
such refusal was considered politically subversive activity and thus qualified as per-
secution based on political opinion); see Bolanos-Hemandez v. INS. 767 F.2d 1277.
1286-87 (9th Cir. 1984) (overruling a BIA decision and granting asylum to a
Salvadoran who fled after refusing to join a guerrilla unit was held to be a demon-
stration of his political opinion, and thus qualified him for asylum under 8 U.S.C. §
1101(A)(42)). But see Pierre v. Rivkind. 825 F.2d 1501. 1506 (11th Cir. 1987) (re-
versing the District Court's finding of persecution where a Haitian had been harrassed
and threatened by the Tontons Macoutes over the use of the family rule).
181. 503 F. Supp. 442, 475 (S.D. Fla. 1980), overruled on other grounds by
Jean v. Nelson, 727 F.2d 957 (11th Cir. 1984).
182. hL at 475-76. The judge stated that an asylum claim cannot be "examined
without an understanding of the conditions in the applicant's homeland." Id. On ap-
peal, the government argued that the District Court had erred in entering findings of
fact on conditions of life in Haiti due to lack of relevancy, and had overstepped its
authority in examining issues that are solely the responsibility of the executive branch.
HRC v. Smith, 676 F.2d 1023, 1042 (5th Cir. 1982), afd sub nora. HRC v. Meese,
791 F.2d 1489 (11th Cir. 1986). But see INS v. Elias-Zacarias, U.S. , 112 S.Ct. 812,
816 (1992) (tightening the definition of "well-founded fear of persecution" by denying
asylum to a Guatemalan civilian whose refusal to give in to guerrilla coercion, caus-
ing him to fear for the safety of his family, was found not to constitute a political
opinion).
183. Civiletti, 503 F. Supp. at 492.
184. Id. at 493. The State Department's Study Team believed the Haitian's rea-
sons for fleeing were purely economic because they told the researchers that they
wanted to find a job in this country. Id. at 492. Research suggests, however, that
such a response may have been given in an effort to satisfy what the refugees be-
lieved the Team wanted to hear, and the response which they believed would conform
to both the cultural ideal of the United States and Haiti. Id. In order to ascertain an
accurate response, the questions should have been worded so as to compensate for
social and cultural influences. Id. See also Martin, supra note 156, at 243-46 (discuss-
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Despite decades of evidence of suppression and terrorism in Haiti, on
June 21, 1993, the United States Supreme Court ruled that the policy of
intercepting refugees at sea and returning them to Haiti was permissi-
ble.'" The Second Circuit had held that returning the Haitians violated
§ 243(h)(i) of INS regulations, which states that the United States can-
not return aliens to their persecutors even if such action is not taken
within its territory." The new ruling further closes the door to refu-
gees and ensures that attempts at illegal entry will increase.
Once refugees arrive illegally in the United States, new problems
develop. Cases such as Plyler v. Doe," for example, address the is-
ing the outcome of In re Santos-Gomes and the effect it should have on other refu-
gees). In In re Santos-Gomez, File No. A29 564 781 (Aug. 24, 1990) (unpublished
decision), a United States immigration judge held that customary international law
prohibited the deportation of a Salvadoran family who had fled civil strife. Id. The
judge ruled that INS could send the family to another country not suffering from
civil conflict and who would be willing to accept the refugees. Id. While the case
departed from the traditional requirement of showing individual persecution, it did not
provide an unconditional safe haven. Id.
185. Sales v. Haitian Centers Council, 61 U.S.L.W. 4684, 4684 (U.S. June 21,
1993). Justice Bla~kmun alone dissented, stating that the law was clear that "vulnera-
ble refugees shall not be returned." Id. at 4686. This decision reversed the Second
Circuit's holding in July 1992 that the Executive Order authorizing the forcible return
of Haitians intercepted at sea violated the INA. McNary v. Haitian Centers Council,
969 F.2d 1350, 1367-68 (2d Cir. 1992). The District Court had earlier denied an
injunction, although it examined conditions in Haiti and acknowledged that thousands
of people were in danger. Haitian Centers Council v. McNary, 789 F. Supp. 541,
543-45 (E.D.N.Y. 1992). The District Court relied on Bertrand v. Sava, 684 F.2d 204,
218 (2d Cir. 1992), which held that Article 33 of the 1951 Convention and 1967
Protocol are non self-executing, relieving the United States of a duty to withhold the
deportation of refugees to their homelands. Id.
Harold Koh, a professor at Yale Law School and lead counsel for the Haitians,
commented that the United States policy on returning Haitians to their prosecutors is
morally reprehensible. Shari Rudavsky, Court Lets U.S. Return Haitians, WASH. POST.
Aug. 2, 1992, at A24; see also Broder, supra note 87, at 3 (recounting President
Clinton's former statements in favor of the Second Circuit decision and contrasting
this with his current support of former President Bush's arguments against admitting
the Haitians).
186. Haitian Centers Council v. McNary, 969 F.2d 1350, 1367 (2d Cir. 1992).
The Second Circuit further held in March 1993 that the Clinton Administration must
provide improved medical care to HIV-infected Haitians being detained at Guantanamo
Bay. Deborah Sontag, Judge Orders Better Care for Haitians with Aids, N.Y. TImES,
March 27, 1993, at 9. Many of these refugees had permission to enter the United
States but were detained after they or their relatives tested positive for HIV. Id.
187. 457 U.S. 202 (1982).
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sues of education and the availability of other public services for refu-
gees, or undocumented aliens, living in the United States."°
While the courts have extended these rights to refugees, many remain
largely unprotected. In order to effectively help more refugees once they
arrive in the United States, reform must come through legislation rather
than judicial rulemaking.
E. REPATRIATION AND RESETTLEMENT
Another way the United States deals with refugees is to return as
many refugee seekers as possible to their homeland." While such re-
patriation is required only where it is certain that repatriated persons
will not be endangered, surveys and personal interviews reveal that the
United States has returned persons even though harm was likely to
occur. 19
188. Id. Plyler prohibited Texas from denying undocumented children of school
age free public education, thereby extending Equal Protection privileges at least in
regards to education. Id. See Bertrand, 684 F.2d at 218-19 (holding that aliens in the
United States were not protected by the provisions of the 1967 Protocol because
Congress did not implement them through legislation); See also Manuel Garcia Y.
Griego, The Rights of Undocumented Mexicans in the United States after Plyler v.
Doe: A Sketch of Moral and Legal Issues, 15 J.L. & EDUC. 57, 81-82 (1986) (dis-
cussing the future of United States obligations toward undocumented persons and
holding that if fairness governs, then the stance should be one in which immigrants
are considered independent of their immigration status); Michael A. Olivas, Plyler v.
Doe, Toll v. Moreno, and Postsecondary Admissions: Undocumented Adults and "En-
during Disability" 15 J. L. & EDUC. 19, 33 (1986) (examining residency requirements
among states and problems posed by their conflicts with federal immigration law);
Michael A. Olivas, "Breaking the Law" On Principle: An Essay on Lmyers' Dilem-
mas, Unpopular Causes, and Legal Regimes, 52 U. Prrr. L. REv. 815, 822 (1991)
(discussing the lack of access to health care and counseling for children in INS de-
tention camps along the U.S.-Mexican border).
189. Kamen, supra note 167, at A8. From late 1989 through 1990, nearly
50,000 documented refugees from Latin America were voluntarily repatriated from
refugee camps in the region through United States and UNHCR commissions. Report
by the U.S. Coordinator for Refugee Affairs, in 1991 Hearings. supra note 163, at
109, 125. The UNHCR follows this policy as well, recently proclaiming in 1992 that
it would become involved in the repatriation efforts that have taken place over the
past ten years. Kamen, supra note 167, at A8. United States and international officials
thought that with the collapse of communism, millions of refugees from Afghanistan,
Cambodia, and the Horn of Africa would be repatriated. Id. However, new refugees,
such as the Haitians, have replaced Cold War refugees. Id.
190. See Haitian Refugee Ctr. v. Civiletti, 503 F. Supp. 442, 475 (S.D. Fla.
1980) (stating that the treatment persons who are repatriated receive is part of a
302 AM. U. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y [VOL. 9:1
Resettlement programs, whereby agencies help refugees settle into
communities in the United States or other countries,'9' are offered by
the United States to a limited number of refugees who apply before they
leave their homeland."9 Those who qualify receive the same rights and
advantages political asylees enjoy, as well as training courses and other
benefits.'93
system of oppression in which prisoners are victims of torture and the Tontons
Macoutes are the law enforcers). The Duvalierists consider persons who flee Haiti to
be opponents, traitors, or spies, and question, imprison or persecute these Haitians
upon their return. Id. at 478. One of the plaintiffs testified that while some returnees
are not arrested immediately, a few days later they vanish. Id. at 481. Those Haitians
that are not arrested continually live with the threat that the Macoutes will prey on
them. Id. at 482. See also Father Henry Atkins, Jr., The Policy of Displacement and
the Flight of Refugees in INTERVENTION ON TRIAL, supra note 95, at 24, 25 (stating
that in the 1980s the United States deported nearly 800 Salvadorans and Guatemalans
per month, and that a number of these refugees were captured at the San Salvador
airport, or arrested once they arrived back in their villages, only to be tortured or
killed). But see Seper, supra note 84 (reporting that FAIR concluded after a five-day
study in Haiti that there is little evidence that repatriated Haitians are oppressed on
account of their status).
191. 8 U.S.C. §§ 1521-1522 (1992).
192. KOEHN, supra note 9, at A8. United States spending on refugee resettle-
ment has continually declined, from $900 million in 1981 to $410 million in 1992,
and a request for only $227 million in the 1993 budget. Id. However, the need for
resettlement has not correspondingly declined. Id. Over 1.8 million persons became
legal residents in 1991, a nineteen percent increase over 1990, and the largest number
in the nation's history. Jerry Seper, 1986 Amnesty Law Cited in Immigration Increase,
WASH. TIMES, June 10, 1992, at A7. This increase was largely due to the 1986
IRCA, which allowed illegal aliens in the United States to apply for temporary resi-
dent status and later become permanent residents. Id. Volunteer agencies active in
resettlement recommended a FY 1992 admissions level of 6,500 for the Latin
American region, comprised of 5,000 spaces for Cubans and 1,500 for other refugees.
Comments and Recommendations of the Voluntary Agencies Active in Refugee Resettle-
ment, reprinted in 1991 Hearings, supra note 163, at 161, 175. They expressed disap-
pointment over the government's failure to adequately address resettlement needs of
non-Cubans from Latin America. Id. The Bush Administration, by contrast, proposed a
FY 1992 ceiling of 3,000 for the region, stating that conditions in those countries had
improved over the past year. Report to the Congress on Proposed Refugee Admissions
for FY 1992, The U.S. Coordinator for Refugee Affairs, reprinted in 1991 Hearings,
supra note 163, at 109, 126. The report claimed that admissions for non-Cubans were
expected to be approximately 100 in FY 1991, and inconsequential in 1992. Id. at
126. See also UNHCR Activities Financed by Voluntary Funds: Report for 1990-91
and Proposed Programs and Budget for 1992, U.N. Doc. A/AC.96/774 (part IV) p.
32-37 (giving the numbers of Latin American refugees repatriated and dollar amounts
of aid given for various programs).
193. KOEHN, supra note 9, at 237. Volunteer agencies give training courses spe-
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Neither of these methods however, address the needs of a substantial
number of refugees. In many cases, repatriation is dangerous or infeasi-
ble, and most refugees are unable to apply for resettlement status before
they are forced to flee.
F. EFFECTS OF CURRENT LEGISLATION
Once denied legal admission to the United States, most refugees do
not return home. Rather, they remain in the United States as undocu-
mented persons."9 This status results in the illegal restriction of the
rights of undocumented aliens." Forced to obtain jobs illegally, undoc-
umented aliens endure workplace conditions violative of health and
safety codes and minimum wage rates. Furthermore, constant fear of
apprehension restricts undocumented refugees in their daily activities."
Despite the enforcement of sanctions,' employers continue to hire
cifically designed for refugees before they arrive in the United States. Id. Additional-
ly, the United States pays their transportation costs. Id. Once in the United States.
they become eligible not only for economic and medical programs, but also federally
sponsored state and local programs that are similarly offered to United States citizens.
Id. In comparison, political asylees receive more advantages than persons granted the
status of Extended Voluntary Departure (EVD), in that they are given work permits,
certain economic and medical assistance lasting twelve months, and language and
other educational programs. l See also Report by the U.S. Coordinator for Refugee
Affairs, supra note 189, at 132 (discussing new eligibility criteria and strategies).
194. CHAV, supra note 44, at 156. While it is difficult to track undocumented
aliens, the number of persons registering for legal immigrant status under the 1986
IRCA gives an indication of the number: between 1988, the first year illegal aliens
were able to register under the program, and 1990, 147,383 Salvadorans. 59,863 Gua-
temalans, and 47,311 Haitians were given immigrant status. Immigrants Admitted by
Country of Birth and Major Category of Admission, FY 1988. 1990, and 1991, INS
Statistics Div., 1992.
195. MANZ, supra note 124, at 190. For example, undocumented persons are not
entitled to Miranda rights when they are apprehended by the INS. Elizabeth Hull, 7he
Rights of Aliens: National and International Issues, in UNAVOIDABLE ISSUES. supra
note 151, at 227.
196. MANz, supra note 124, at 190.
197. CHAVEZ, supra note 44, at 157. A refugee in San Diego stated that it was
not good to stray from the camps. ld. The woman said she felt afraid. Id. The INS
routinely stops and interrogates people they suspect to be illegal aliens. Id. at 161.
See INS v. Delgado, 466 U.S. 210 (1984) (holding that random interrogations by INS
agents of employees at factories are constitutional under the Fourth Amendment).
198. 8 U.S.C. § 1324a(a)(1) (1988), amended by Pub. L. No. 101-649. 104 Stat.
4978, 5053, (1990). See also 1991 Hearings, supra note 163, at 220 (stating that
IRCA compounded the difficulty of being an undocumented person, and questioning
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illegal and undocumented refugees."9 Such persons usually work for
lower wages than American citizens, and accept jobs that Americans
refuse. These workers are generally viewed by employers as dependable
and hardworking.' In addition to falling outside the the scope of pro-
tection afforded by laws designed to end the exploitation of labor, un-
documented refugees cannot participate in many tax-suppo'ted
programs."' Although recent court decisions, most notably Plyer v.
Doe,' have extended access to education, access to health care and
housing continues to be limited by federal, state, and local programs.2
IV. RECOMMENDATIONS
Some scholars' and legislators believe that the 1990 Immigration
Act and its grant of TPS to Salvadorans has solved many of the refugee
problems, as it gives Salvadorans already in the United States legal
status, albeit temporary. However, the current legislation fails to extend
protection to refugees presently in need of assistance, and does not
extend safe haven to refugees from future civil conflicts."° The Act
also fails to protect Salvadorans who arrived in this country after Sep-
the fairness of the effects of IRCA falling equally on all aliens despite their reasons
for leaving their homeland).
199. See CHAVEZ, supra note 44, at 19 (reporting that because the 1986 IRCA
required workers to have documentation, a market in forged security cards and im-
migration cards has developed).
200. Id.
201. l
202. 457 U.S. 202 (1982)
203. CHAVEZ, supra note 44, at 19. See Olivas, supra note 185. at 821-26 (dis-
cussing the living conditions in INS detention camps in southern United States).
204. Martin, supra note 156, at 254 (concluding that the 1990 Act is a "long-
awaited piece of legislation" addressing safe haven).
205. See 1991 Hearings, supra note 163, at 103-04 (letter to the President from
the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, Oct. 1, 1991) (recommending that the 1,000
unallocated spaces in the 1992 admissions proposal be saved for refugees "at risk" as
determined by the UNHCR). The letter recognizes that some refugees must be moved
quickly, and that the United States does "not always respond well to individual refu-
gees in need of urgent protection." Id. Reserving room for such refugees would per-
mit this country to provide more adequate assistance. Id. However, the actual number
of Haitians intercepted between October and June is estimated at 34,000. White- House
Statement on Haitian Immigrants, supra note 78, at 924. In the face of such numbers,
an allocation of 1,000 does not go far. State representatives of Central America have
broadened the definition of refugee through the Declaration of Cartagena on Refugees,
Nov. 22, 1984, Inter-Amer. C.H.R. O.A.S. Doc. OEA/ser. GCP/CAJP - 563/85 (1985).
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tember 19, 1990, as well as those who were deported during the 1980s
because they failed to meet refugee criteria.
As TPS has never been awarded to Guatemalans, they receive no
benefit from this legislation. Further, the Act fails to protect Haitians
currently attempting to obtain refugee status in the United States, since
they must be in the country when TPS is granted. If the Attorney Gen-
eral decides to award TPS to Haitian nationals, such status will only
benefit those who manage to enter the United States surreptitiously.
With the mass interception of Haitians by the Coast Guard, the number
of refugees receiving TPS will be lower than that of the Salvadorans
who were not subject to an interdiction program.
As recent events illustrate, neither the executive, the legislative,7
nor the judiciary branches have taken effective steps to aid these new
refugees. In order to achieve long-term, effective protective measures,
the United States should broaden the definition of refugee to include
persons fleeing from mass terror. The United States must, however, re-
tain some control over the number of refugees and immigrants it pro-
tects, lest it drains its capacity and resources.' Indeed, a device to
keep the numbers as low as possible while still fulfilling humanitarian
goals would have to accompany such legislation. However, as point-
206. See supra notes 74 and 83 and accompanying text (discussing the interdic-
tion programs of 1981 and 1992).
207. See H.R. 5360, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. (1992) (reaffirming United States
obligations under the 1967 Protocol and 1951 Convention prohibiting the return of
refugees outside United States boundaries or "within the territorial waters of another
country" without first determining refugee status); Compare S. 2246, 102d Cong., 2d
Sess. (1992) (proposing that Haitians under United States control not be returned
involuntarily until 180 days after enactment of the bill or 5 days after completion of
a study on the treatment of Haitians who were repatriated, and urging the President
to work with the UNHCR and OAS to convene a conference to resolve the crisis)
with H.R. 3844, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. (1992) (mirroring S. 2246 and adding "Sense
of Congress" statements urging the President to act quickly and appropriately).
208. See Hull, supra note 195, at 215, 238 (concluding that countries have the
right to close their borders for any reason, whether compelling or not, and referring
to John S. Mills' tenet that an overpopulated country "will upset the ideal"); see also
Roger Conner, Updating the Golden Rule for the Global Village, in AMICAN REFU-
GEE POLICY, supra note 9, at 47 (stating that allowing the United States to exceed its
capacity now will force a "lower quality of life" on future generations, but that.
problematically, the capacity of the United States has not yet been determined).
209. See 8 U.S.C. § 1157(a) (1988) (setting a ceiling, adjusted annually, on
refugee admissions); see also 8 U.S.C. § 1157(b) (1988) (allowing the President to
admit, after determining through "appropriate consultation" that an "unforeseen emer-
gency" exists, or admission is justified by humanitarian concerns). Such persons may
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ed out in Section Im (F) of this Comment, a large number of refugees
remain in the United States anyway, demonstrating that the issue of
ceilings and quotas is merely academic. Acknowledging the presence of
undocumented persons and allowing them legal status would enable
them to participate and contribute to society, thereby improving access
to health, safety, and educational benefits.
Real reform may require an overall change in priority to reconcile the
reality of United States resource limitations with an obligation to offer
safe haven to those in life-threatening situations. Moreover, it may be
possible now to depart from policies giving priority to persons fleeing
Communist governments, and instead admit Guatemalans, Haitians, and
Salvadorans based on "special humanitarian concern."
The definition of political refugee should be broadened to include
individuals and groups fleeing dangerous conditions who cannot meet
the criteria for persecution under its current interpretation."' This
would not only appropriately address problems facing "economic" refu-
gees and allow them safe haven, but would align U.S. standards with
international law.' As this Comment demonstrates, the label "econom-
ic" refugee is inaccurate in many instances. While refugees are usually
unable to prove individual persecution based on their activities, govern-
ments have been or currently are engaged in activities that result in
mass persecutions of civilians. These groups need to be protected just as
much as the individual who can prove political persecution.
CONCLUSION
The United States must redefine the term "refugee," or broaden the
current interpretation of "political" refugee to include those fleeing coun-
tries plagued by mass terror. By failing to extend protection to "eco-
nomic" refugees, Congress leaves them at great risk and fails to meet
by statute stay for 12 months. 8 U.S.C. § 1157(b)(3) (1988).
210. KOEHN, supra note 9, at 410. See also WEINSTEIN & SEGAL, supra note
46, at 126 (arguing that the definition of refugee must be reached by including facts
of the refugee's political life as well as the realization that the refugee faces persecu-
tion by authorities regardless of whether the refugee has opposed the regime); Refu-
gee Policy Group Report, supra note 17, (stating that reasons for fleeing a country or
not wanting to return are more complex than those provided for in the statutory defi-
nition, and that while many persons might not have a "well-founded fear of persecu-
tion", they do have a "well-founded fear of injury, deprivation of human rights, and
even death").
211. KOEHN, supra note 9, at 410.
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international standards. Until Congress recognizes that economic mi-
grants are in fact refugees from economic crises incurred by political
events, and thus are nearly indistinguishable from "political" refugees, it
cannot begin to create protective, long-term policies that meet interna-
tional standards and address the actual problems.
